

Communication and rural development

Juan E. Díaz Bordenave



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Communication and rural development

Juan E. Díaz Bordenave

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
Preface

In its programme for the development of communication systems, Unesco has long been concerned with the role that the media can play in rural areas. The present study is intended to help specialists working in rural communication programmes by seeking to draw from the results of research principles which can serve as guides to more effective programme designs.

Frequent criticisms levelled against communication research are that its findings are not always reflected in ongoing communication programmes and the communication researcher has all too few exchanges with the media practitioner. This study is an attempt to gauge the accuracy of these criticisms, in the context of rural development. The author first examines the emergence of various theoretical concepts of communication and then sets these against a representative group of rural development projects featuring communication media, to see where—and to what extent—interfaces are to be found. In this way, he takes a positive approach to the problem of interaction between theory and practice, and argues his own conclusions for an improvement in the dialogue.

The author, Juan E. Díaz Bordenave, studied agriculture in Argentina and became a small farmer for two years in Paraguay, his native country, before entering the communication field. He holds a Master's degree in Agricultural Journalism from the University of Wisconsin and a Ph.D. in Communication from Michigan State University. Since 1956 he has worked as a communication specialist for the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, a branch of the Organization of American States. In that capacity he has worked in Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. He now lives in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

The opinions expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Unesco.



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Introduction

So many projects for the development of the world's rural areas through communication have been launched in the last twenty years that they escape an accurate listing.

These projects have received funds and backing from many different sources: national governments, international organizations, bilateral aid agencies, religious groups, private firms, citizens' associations, self-help organizations. They have been aimed at numerous audiences: farmers, women, youth, the whole rural population.

In nature, the projects have varied from relatively simple one-way dissemination of technical information to more sophisticated two-way or multi-way systems involving participatory communication. Content has also been extremely heterogeneous: agricultural technology, health and hygiene, family planning, co-operative development, literacy training, 'conscientization' and so on. Institutional arrangements have shown a similar diversity.

One thing is common to all rural communication projects, however. Each is built on a series of ideological assumptions. Examine any communication project for rural development and you will discover assumptions about the nature of man, diffusion, learning, change, society.

Moreover, the assumptions underlying a given project generally agree with the idea of development widely accepted at the time and location of the project. This correspondence is only logical, since communication is both an organic part of development and an instrument for furthering that process.

Consciously or unconsciously, these assumptions, and the idea of development at work, determine such important characteristics of the project as its goals, strategies, clientele, methods, messages, institutional arrangements, and even the evaluation of results.

The considerations given above seem to justify pausing in our work as communication planners, practitioners, teachers, trainers and researchers to observe with greater detachment what is happening in our field, to spot the key variables in the process of rural communication for development, to theorize

about them, and to develop proposals for improvement. Such a stop for thinking is the purpose of this book.

More specifically, its purposes are:

To examine the hypothesis that much recent and present-day use of communication media for rural development does not take adequate account of the theoretical work done up to now on the function of communication media in reaching rural adult populations and on the nature of the diffusion process. In other words, to ask: Is there a gap between theory and practice in rural development efforts involving communication media? If so, why?

If such a gap does exist, to indicate how those designing and carrying out rural development projects could make better use of theory, and how theoreticians and practitioners could work more closely in the future in solving their communication problems.

The plan of the book is as follows:

Chapter 1 briefly reviews the development of theoretical concepts about the nature of communication and the use of communication media in development.

Chapter 2 examines a representative group of past rural development projects using communication media, providing for each, where possible, information on a series of key variables that help analyse these case studies.

Chapter 3 critically comments on the case studies: to what extent these projects were consciously or unconsciously based on theoretical models; what models were most often used; to what extent the models suited the project's development objectives; where a conscious theoretical basis is lacking, why this was so; what effects this lack had on the project's success. It also draws some conclusions on how theoreticians can better serve rural development practitioners.

Chapter 1

Communication theory and rural development: a brief review

Any attempt to use mass communication for rural development can be said to have a theoretical foundation. That is, it is based on certain assumptions about how people acquire and accept or reject information, ideas and beliefs and about how they use their knowledge and act on the basis of convictions.

Similarly, every such effort also presupposes a concept of development. For example, for some, development is handing over technology to the unskilled so that they can become more productive; for others, it is awakening the intellectual and decision-making potential of rural people so that they themselves can change the very structure of society.

These two underlying concepts—one regarding the nature of communication and the other that of development—are closely related.

The theoretical study of communication's role in rural development has advanced with the growth of empirical knowledge, as a result of finding out what works and what does not. New approaches have been devised to overcome perceived weaknesses in previous efforts, and attempts have been made to explain why some approaches fail and others succeed.

The theoretical study of rural development communication has also been influenced by the evolution of accepted ideas about development. It has not only been concerned with how communication contributes to bringing about change and why; it has also had to consider shifts in thinking about what kinds of changes rural development should foster.

Thus, although theoreticians tend to state their views in absolute terms, there are no absolutely 'right' or 'wrong' theoretical models for rural development communication. A model that seems to work in one kind of development situation may not be suitable for another. Today theoreticians know much more about communication in rural settings than they did ten or twenty years ago; tomorrow they will need to know even more.

At the risk of oversimplification, we will attempt here a brief historical review of theoretical approaches to communication. We deliberately ascribe no

dates to the various concepts described, nor do we attempt to document statements about them.

From source to receiver: a one-way road

Up until the Renaissance, the central concern in communication was 'content', or 'ideas'. The form in which ideas were presented and the means of diffusion were considered less important than the ideas themselves.

With the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg, the number of people who could be reached and influenced by ideas increased considerably. This fact drew attention to channels of communication, particularly to books and, later, journals. Books were banned, smuggled and even burnt. Journalism acquired prestige as a political tool and eventually became a full-fledged profession. Faced with a large audience instead of a privileged few, communicators refined the art of message elaboration and simplified the pompous and erudite language previously used in order to facilitate the public's acceptance of their ideas.

Communication became the object of scientific study only when electronic media were invented and adopted. It was no coincidence that the first formal model of the communication process originated with electrical engineers and mathematicians (Fig. 1).




FIG. 1. The telecommunication model.

Many key concepts—for example, 'signal', 'sign', 'code', 'message', 'source', 'destination', 'channel', 'information', 'encoding' and 'decoding'—were first made explicit by this model.

The authors of the telecommunication model were not concerned with the human aspects of communication, whether face-to-face or through the mass media. Perhaps for this reason, most of the thinking and research on communication that followed was based on a rather simple, mechanistic view of communication as a process of message transmission.

During the Second World War, all forms of communication received a great deal of attention. Signals and codes took on military importance, and communication was vital to propaganda and psychological warfare. For these reasons, the dominant concept became that of communication as persuasion.

What was learned about communication during this period was transferred to various fields of activity, particularly advertising and technological change, which acquired considerable importance after the Second World War. In both fields, communication as transmission of information and communication as persuasion were the orientations adopted. Within a short time, people engaged in such professions as public relations, agricultural extension, health education and so on began to show interest in these applications of communication.

The basic characteristic of the communication approaches used in advertising and in promoting technical change was a preoccupation with effects: the purchase of a given product, the adoption of a given attitude, the acceptance of a farm practice, the modification of a nutritional habit. Comparing the marketing model and the agricultural extension model shows their common orientation (Figs. 2 and 3).




FIG. 2. The marketing model.




FIG. 3. The agricultural extension model.

The preoccupation with effects increased when concern with economic development spread to the developing countries. The essence of economic development was seen to be a rapid growth in economic productivity. Inasmuch as such an increase requires considerable human change, and communication was perceived as an agent of change, communication was considered, at least by communicators, a key instrument for development.

The pressures of economic development goals, the size and dispersion of

target audiences in developing areas, the availability of modern communication technology, and an interest in selling expensive communication equipment all worked to make the media an important element in rural development programmes. Development personnel strived to use the latest gadgets ('hardware') in carrying out aggressive multimedia campaigns. As a consequence, the relevance and accuracy of content were often neglected, and slower, more profound approaches to education were discarded. There was, however, a positive effect: many technicians in developing countries were trained in the use of media.

Communication theory turns to the social sciences

A significant enrichment of development communication theory occurred when communicators applied the idea of process, acquired from the philosophical and scientific thinking of the times, to communication. A view of communication as a process takes into account the infinite number of variables involved in any communication act: the image the sender has of the receiver, and vice versa; the personal experiences, values and expectations of both the source and the receivers; the subtle variations of meaning that symbols and situations can have; the many and varying aspects of the cultural context, and so on. In this view, communication participates in the complexity of life itself and is no longer seen as a purely mechanistic phenomenon. John Ball says: ¹

It is the concept of process that prevents our supplying easy formulas for communication and that permits us instead to promise an approach that is realistic and based firmly on current knowledge in a range of scientific fields.

Gradually, communicators began to take more aspects of the communication situation into account, and to approach it in a relativistic frame of mind. It became accepted that a thing can be perceived differently by different persons, and that 'reality' is not that objective and absolute. The expression 'meanings are not in words but in people' became a cliché. This new orientation meant a revolution for many change agents who previously had believed that a technically correct message should be universally accepted just because it was 'correct'.

The process idea led communication experts to extract specialized knowledge about variables affecting the communication process from the reservoir of social science disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, social psychology, psychology, political science and economics.

From sociology, to mention but one case, communication borrowed two ideas which attracted the interest of scholars and practitioners for a while: the concepts of social systems and of diffusion of innovations.

Social systems were said to be any interactive social structure (a family, a church congregation, a rural community and so on) having ends or objectives, norms, status roles, power, social rank, sanctions, facilities and territoriality. The life of social systems occurred through several important processes, such as

1. John Ball, 'Process: The Conceptual Basis for Communication', *Research, Principles and Practices in Visual Communication*, East Lansing, Mich., National Project in Agricultural Communications, 1960.

communication, decision-making, boundary maintenance, and social-cultural linkage. Communication was defined as ¹

the process by which information, decisions, and directives pass through a social system, and the ways in which knowledge, opinions and attitudes are formed or modified.

The social system concept made communicators aware of how organically and intimately communication is related to other elements and processes of society. Nevertheless, its contribution to a theoretical understanding of development communication was limited because the social system model explained social conflict and social change essentially in terms of a search for equilibrium. Such a search does not characterize the developing countries. Thus, the concept was eventually replaced by the more general idea of 'systems' (see below).

The ideas and research generated by study of the diffusion of innovations grew out of the concern with technological change, seen as a key element in economic development. North American rural sociologists, and later their colleagues in Europe and Latin America, concentrated their attention on such aspects of the diffusion of innovations as: (a) the personal antecedents favouring the adoption and diffusion of a new idea; (b) the social characteristics of individuals and communities influencing the adoption and diffusion of practices; (c) the behaviour stages the farmer undergoes from the time he meets a new idea until he adopts it (awareness, interest, evaluation, trial and decision); (d) the characteristics of a new idea or practice that make it more or less adoptable (comptability, divisibility, complexity, communicability, etc.); (e) the personal roles intervening in the diffusion of an innovation within a given community (innovator, opinion leader, laggard, etc.).

Among the various applications of the concept, an important one for communication was the discovery of the different usefulness of impersonal and personal channels (mass media versus friends and neighbours) at different stages of the adoption process. The diffusion mentality also generated a great deal of enthusiasm for the use of opinion leaders as channels of information and influence. This, in turn, produced a search for reliable techniques to spot such leaders.

Among the many criticisms thrown at the diffusion model were that it does not take account of the constraints imposed by social structures in the developing countries; it pays insufficient attention to the quality of the practices to be diffused and to the competency of adoption agents; and it relies on a 'dripping-down' view of development communication, which fails to provide for feedback and communication from farmers to the sources of innovations. The diffusionist models were, it seems, conceived to explain what happens in the more developed countries, where the farmer may be considered a decision-making unit. But this is hardly the case in the developing countries, where most farmers are subject to social and economic constraints of all kinds.

1. J. Allan Beegle and Charles P. Loomis, *Rural Sociology, the Strategy of Change*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1957.

Attention switches to the receiver

Two more recent ideas have enriched theoretical views of communication significantly: those of communication functions and social structure.

The idea of function grew out of the observation that people use communication because it accomplishes certain functions for them. They listen to the radio, read the newspapers, attend meetings and so on not because an external source wants to communicate something to them, but because they themselves feel the media satisfy some of their needs. Obviously, communication performs different functions for different people. One person may listen to the radio to obtain useful information, while another mainly cherishes the feeling of companionship the speaker's voice provides.

The idea of communication functions led to a distinction between instrumental and consumatory communication. Instrumental communication refers to content the receiver may apply to a utilitarian end. Consumatory communication refers to content that reduces tension or produces pleasure. For example, farmers seek out agricultural information on the radio to improve their work, while they listen to sports broadcasts or folk music because these produce excitement and pleasure. In theory, some media are more suitable for instrumental communication, others for the consumatory type. In practice, however, the distinction between the two is not so sharp.

Daniel Lerner, in his book *The Passing of Traditional Society*,¹ contributed a fresh viewpoint to thinking about the communication process—the idea of 'empathy'. Empathy refers to a person's ability to put himself in the place of another, to see the world as the other person does. According to Lerner, this ability is essential for development since it is only by assuming the viewpoint of more 'modern' persons that a peasant can desire to change his present life.

The analysis of the functions that communication fulfils in people's lives led to another important observation: not only do people like to receive communication from others, they also like to communicate what they think and feel to others. Thus, to the concept of communication were added such notions as *expression, relationship and participation*.

An interesting manifestation of the attention paid to the receiver in the study of the communication process is the concept of 'co-orientation', which has become popular in the United States recently. The idea behind this concept is that two persons can have similar perceptions and interpretations of the same object, and the greater the similarity ('co-orientation') the more efficient will be the flow of communication between the persons. Conversely, an intense flow of communication may increase co-orientation. The concept of co-orientation, an extension of the concept of empathy, may help improve the relationship between communication change agents and their audiences. Co-orientation can also be used as a didactic tool to increase receiver-orientation among communicators.

The persuasion-for-effect mentality is so dominant among development planners and change agents, however, that the human needs for expression, relationship and participation stressed in the theories outlined above were often not adequately valued in themselves. Instead, knowledge about them has been used to improve techniques of persuading and manipulating people. Thus, the

1. Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1958.

discovery that people accept an innovation more easily if they first discuss it among themselves and then collectively decide to adopt it has been widely utilized to justify coupling the practice of group dynamics with persuasive efforts. Similarly, findings on the important role of the intermediary receiver-transmitter, or opinion leader, were used by effect-oriented communicators to design better strategies of mass persuasion and not necessarily to satisfy people's need for co-orientation and co-operative problem-solving.

During the decades of the 1940s and 1950s, the community development movement acquired importance in the Western countries providing technical assistance to developing regions of the world. Communication then entered a stage in which receivers were seen not as isolated individuals but as members of global human communities, with problems that could only be solved collectively. The awareness of the community's potential to diagnose, articulate and mobilize resources to solve its problems enriched communication; it demonstrated the close relationship that must exist between messages and community decision-making, thus engaging communication's involvement in such activities as: (a) encouraging diagnosis by the community of its own situation and problem; (b) providing access to all relevant information on alternatives; (c) organizing the people; (d) aiding the community to obtain means and resources—that is, power; (e) creating suitable institutions for community decision-making and collective action.

Communication theory discovers social structure

Not all communities are alike, however, nor, it became apparent, is each community a homogeneous unit. The concept of social structure views society as a network of statuses and roles in which some persons occupy more privileged positions of power and control than others.

If a given social structure is such that most of a person's decisions are influenced or thwarted by external forces, we can be sure that his access to information and communication will also be limited. Moreover, for a person in these circumstances, the major function of communication will tend to be facilitating his adjustment to his existential situation.

In recent years a number of studies have been made of the relationship between social structure and the role of communication. To summarize the viewpoint and findings of these studies, let us take the case of a typical hierarchical social structure, one consisting of a small group of ruling élites, a larger middle class, and a popular mass which constitutes the majority. (In developing countries there may also be foreign groups, situated even higher in the hierarchy than the ruling élites, which are able to impose their decisions, values and strategies.)

In such a system, the lower strata attempt to identify with the élites, adopting their perceptions of the world, their values, their ways of relating to others—in short, their ideology. This is partly because to survive within the society the communication media must act as vehicles of this ideology. The population does not perceive that, along with news, technical information and entertainment provided through various channels (newspapers, magazines, television and radio programming, advertisements, etc.), it is absorbing the ideology of the dominant élites. In fact, it can even internalize beliefs and values antagonistic to its own interests.

In this kind of system, communication serves the establishment and the social *status quo*. Most dissident ideas not approved by the élites are ignored by the media because they are also a threat to their interests. Other are picked up by the media and returned to the audience in a distorted form less disturbing to the established order.

An awareness of the ideological influences exerted through the mass media in many societies has led several researchers to investigate the content of media (newspapers, comic books, radio and television soap operas, and so on) from this viewpoint. They discovered that in some developing countries the mass media do in fact often transmit certain values and beliefs that may be detrimental to national development—for example, consumerism, exaggerated individuality, the cult of violence, élitism. The discovery of the subliminal influence of mass media on the formation of national attitudes has enriched the understanding of communication; most significantly, it has shown that many messages supposedly supporting national development may in fact be aiming only at ‘Westernization’, and even at perpetuating anachronistic social structures.

A rigid class structure is not the only factor cutting off the great mass of the population in developing countries from the communication media. Other studies of access to information by the rural populations of these countries have revealed the disadvantaged situation of rural people as far as the media are concerned. Content analyses of mass media have shown that most messages are urban-oriented and thus largely irrelevant for rural people. Moreover, the media penetrate very insignificantly into some rural areas. As for the print media, their diffusion is necessarily limited where illiteracy is rampant. While this is not the case for radio and television, the commercial interests that often control these channels find it more profitable to aim their broadcasts at the richer urban consumers. Thus, in many areas the only channels open for peasant communication are the interpersonal channels; indeed, most studies demonstrate the predominance of personal contacts in diffusing messages in rural areas.

Communication as a system; communication in systems

A relatively recent approach that has enriched thinking about communication considerably is the concept of ‘systems’. A system is any set of interacting parts that maintains its boundaries while exchanging influences with its environment. Inputs are the influences received from the environment; through various processes the system transforms these into outputs. Outputs are the products, services and influences delivered by the system with the aim of transforming its environment (Fig. 4).

Systems are essentially a mental construct, a way of looking at the world. Almost anything can be conceived as a system: the human body, a cell, a tree, a shoe factory, a communication programme. A system can be mechanical, passive, and incapable of reacting to its environment (such as a clock); it can be reactive and designed to fulfil a goal or goals (such as an unmanned lunar vehicle); or it can be evolving and goal-establishing (such as a business enterprise).

A communication programme is a goal-establishing system because those responsible for it formulate a set of objectives which they can change as the programme proceeds. They can also choose and adapt the means to achieve these objectives.

A close look at how human systems work has shown that communication is the very essence of these systems; it supplies information about environmental needs and conditions; facilitates internal interaction and co-ordination through information exchange; channels—through outgoing messages—the system's influences on the environment; and brings back—through feedback—information about the environment's reactions and its changing needs.




FIG. 4. System components.

While the idea of 'reaction' or 'response' is not new, it was the concept of systems that revealed the full importance of this element of communication, now known as 'feedback'. In the past, feedback was considered useful for determining audience reaction or the effects of a message. Currently, feedback is considered an integral component, not only of a communication system, but of any kind of reactive system, inasmuch as it triggers corrective mechanisms that keep the system working towards its established goal, as shown in Figure 5.




FIG. 5.

The theory of systems and the systems approach have not completely banished the 'transmission-persuasion' tradition in development communication. In fact, in the hands of development technocrats the systems concept can become a straitjacket discouraging human individuality and originality just because these upset the neat goal-seeking design of the system.

Nevertheless, introducing the systems concept into the theoretical study of development communication has had several positive consequences. For one, viewing events systemically reveals how the various aspects of rural development are interrelated. Low productivity, for instance, is seen as organically associated with other factors usually handled by separate development organizations. As a result, communicators having a systemic viewpoint tend to approach development problems with a broader, more inclusive outlook and thus make a more useful contribution to integrated programmes and projects.

For another, the attention to objectives inherent in the systems approach has made for a more careful analysis of problems at the planning stage of development communication programmes. It has also led planners to pay more attention to matching the media used in a programme to the problems the programme is meant to attack and to the means available.

In addition, the concept of systems leads to awareness of the fact that development programmes and institutions are but subsystems within larger systems and, therefore, their goals must be consistent with and support the goals of the larger system.

At the same time, important by-products of the systems approach are having a deep and beneficial effect on development communication.

For example, one very important trend growing out of this approach is an interest in formulating over-all communication policies and plans. In other words, the more careful analysis that the systems approach has promoted in designing given development communication programmes has an analogue in the examination of the totality of communication activities—what they are now and what they should be.

To formulate communication policies and then plans, it is necessary to study the norms in society that govern assumptions about communication and communication practices. From the results of such a study, one can elicit general principles for action. Communication planning, like educational or economic planning, encompasses a whole sector of activity, rising above structural or administrative distinctions (for example, the fact that several separate governmental ministries as well as non-governmental bodies may be involved in providing or regulating communication). Communication planning seeks to make an inventory of all communication resources and to use these resources in the most effective way possible in line with set objectives. Since in the developing countries these objectives usually concern the orientation of society towards development, and since communication resources are scarce, communication planning can contribute to ensuring that resources in these countries will be used to promote all forms of development including rural development. Communication planning on a national level is receiving growing attention both from national governments and from international agencies.

The systems approach has also inspired research in other associated disciplines which has important implications for development communication. One of these disciplines is educational technology. Some results of the research done on the use of new methods and materials in formal (school) education have been

shown to have application to nonformal (out-of-school, developmental) education. This fertilization from one field to the other has become more intense as Unesco, the Food and Agricultural Organization and bilateral and other international aid agencies and research organizations have grown more interested in the areas of out-of-school education and rural development. It is not only a question of transferring the use of certain methods and materials (though this is important) but, even more significant, of adopting a new approach to the study of learning and communication. Present-day innovative educational technology is above all a discipline of synthesis, and a trend towards synthesis is what seems very much required in development communication studies—both to extend our knowledge of possibilities and potentials, and to humanize the range of earlier theories.

Communication as an instrument for changing society

The various concepts enriching our knowledge of the role of communication in rural development summarized above did not significantly alter the generally accepted view of communication as a means of transmitting information in order to persuade. On the whole, the behaviour of communicators—teachers, change agents, advertising experts, politicians and so on—has revealed an orientation that is essentially vertical, directive, aimed at manipulation and indoctrination.

This orientation seems a natural consequence of a view of development that stresses 'modernization'. According to this view, 'backward' countries should adopt the values, the social organization and the technology of the more advanced countries. Also communication should serve to promote these values, this organization, and this technology.

However, in recent years this concept of development has been challenged as a result of repeated failures, and a new notion of development, more centred on the people concerned, has been proposed. At the same time, the 'modernization' orientation of development communication has begun to be criticized and modified.

Credit for explaining the weaknesses of the traditional view of development communication belongs to many thinkers and practitioners. Probably best known among them is Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator who has vividly described present communication and education systems as tools for the domination and domestication of the masses. Freire points out that merely transferring content from a knowledgeable and authoritative source to a passive receiver does nothing to promote the receiver's growth as a person with an autonomous and critical conscience capable of contributing to and influencing his society.

Thus, Freire proposes transforming what he calls 'banking education' into a 'pedagogy of the oppressed' based on the following principles:

Faith in the people's ability to learn, to change, and to liberate themselves from oppressive conditions of ignorance, poverty and exploitation.

Direct contact of the learners with their own reality and its problems; analysis of the constraints imposed on them by social structure and official 'ideology'.

Elimination of the differences between 'educator' and 'educatee' in so far as they are both 'learners'.

Free dialogue.

Participation in liberating action.

Under the influence of Freire, Ivan Illich and others, many communicators have come to think of communication as a process that is inseparable from the other social and political processes necessary for national development and independence. The numerous failures and frustrations met by modernization efforts have shown that communication, to be really effective, must be organically integrated with such processes as conscientization, organization, politicization and technification.

The argument goes as follows: if the transfer of technology to the rural population is promoted unilaterally within a social structure containing large commercial farmers with big landholdings, family farmers with medium-sized farms, and landless agricultural workers, benefits are likely to be concentrated in the hands of the most privileged, those with better access to resources, instruction, credit, influence and power.

To provide more equal access to the benefits of development, therefore, it is necessary to foster grass-roots organization of the least favoured aimed at forming pressure groups and facilitating collective action. However, in order to organize effectively people must become conscious of their rights and their potential. Conscientization alone, though, may lead to frustration and repression if, at the same time, the people do not attain a degree of *politicization* giving them not only a reason to change but also the decision-making and leadership abilities necessary to achieve power.

It is evident that communication can be an important means for achieving conscientization, organization, politicization, and technification. However, for communication to play this role a coherent communication philosophy and methodology must be accepted by all institutions involved. This is possible only in countries having adopted a development model calling for popular participation in social and political transformation at all levels.

Experiments are now in progress in the use of communication technology to improve communication among the people and between the people and the government. The government and the people normally communicate through two kinds of channels: (a) administrative channels, which include the service agencies and bureaucratic organizations; and (b) political channels, including political parties, elections and so on. These experiments aim at opening a third kind of channel, independent of the other two, to allow a dialogue between the people and the authorities. Some of these experiments are described in Chapter 2 and analysed in Chapter 3.

Thus, the conviction is growing that the people should have more access to the communication media, not as receivers only but also as sources and actors. The adoption of this new approach to communication is producing several significant innovations in rural development communication:

Media are becoming more accessible to the participation of rural populations in programming.

Messages are originated among the rural populations, and government agents, technocrats and élites—who previously always acted as sources—are learning to become receivers.

The content of the messages is more relevant to rural people's problems and needs.

Rural people are learning to formulate and articulate their ideas and feelings about matters important to them.

The government is learning to communicate less paternalistically and with less authoritarianism, making possible a dialogue with rural populations.

New technologies—such as audio and video tape recording—are making it possible to register messages and feedback from all parties in the dialogues, facilitating mutual perception and understanding.

This new orientation to communication has not yet resulted in well-worked-out communication and education methodologies for rural development. Very little research has been done so far on horizontal and participative communication. However, present-day technology is singularly promising for dialogue on a massive scale. This is a case in which theory is lagging behind actual practice and technological competence: most communication models still reveal a transmission-persuasion orientation, and only a few scholars have speculated on communication's role in facilitating the popular participation and action required for rural development.

Summary

This brief review of the gradual enrichment of our understanding of the role communication can play in rural development reveals the existence, and often the coexistence, of at least four basic theoretical approaches: (a) communication as persuasion; (b) communication as transmission of information; (c) communication as personal expression, social interaction and relationship; and (d) communication as a vital instrument of social and political change associated with authentic rural development.

In most actual development communication projects it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure separately the influence of these four approaches. Nevertheless, it is clear that in applying communication to development goals, communicators will emphasize one or more of the approaches at the expense of the others.

The approach or approaches stressed in a given country are related to the political model of development adopted by that country. If the model is one that aims at modernization without socio-structural change, the role assigned communication will probably emphasize persuasion and transmission of information. If, instead, the model calls for fostering broad popular participation and the development of the individual, communication will probably be expected to facilitate personal expression and dialogue. Thus, when we come to analyse a given rural communication project, we must also look at the general development framework within which it is working.

So far we have been examining theoretical approaches to the use of communication in rural development. The next two chapters deal with actual development projects that used communication and discuss how closely, and how appropriately, these followed theoretical models.

Chapter 2

Case studies in communication and rural development

National development agencies working in any aspect of rural development—be it agricultural extension, hygiene, education, family planning or civic organization—generally face a dramatic disproportion between the number of development personnel available for rural work and the number and geographical dispersion of their clientele. Communication media provide an important means of compensating for this shortage of personnel.

Governmental and other development agencies have been slow, however, in using the media to extend the reach of their change agents in rural areas. The first large-scale experiments in radio forums and radio schools are relatively recent: Canada beginning in 1941, Colombia in 1948 and India in 1956.

In the last twenty years, though, there has been a significant trend towards involving communication media in rural development, and the number of projects using communication in rural areas has grown constantly. Projects have also become more complex and sophisticated: while only one medium was employed at first, more recently a multi-media approach has become common.

Today new devices such as television, video tapes, audio tapes, telephone networks, two-way radio and so on are being added to the media arsenal. Media are also being used for new purposes: while in the past they were universally considered a one-way channel for informing, motivating, persuading and instructing, today they are also providing a means of national and collective participation in decision-making.

Some people wonder if this is not another case of the application of technology preceding the development of theory about when and how this technology should be used. It would seem that communication projects are included in development programmes more often because the 'hardware' is available to supplement inadequate personnel than as a result of an analysis based on theoretical knowledge of the role communication can play in rural development. Perhaps this is because most rural communication projects are designed and established by media practitioners, those who are most concerned with the

immediate challenge of reaching rural populations, and not by communication theoreticians and researchers.

Nevertheless, these practitioners are a little worried. They feel that there may be a certain gap between the models and principles communication theoreticians and researchers have developed at universities and research institutes and the actual projects they have designed and run in the developing areas. They suspect that if theoretical knowledge is not applied to action projects—to their design, execution and evaluation—these projects may continue to exhibit the same weaknesses and mistakes over and over. Apparently, man needs theoretical models in order to understand reality and to imagine alternative ways of transforming it. 'Nothing is more practical than a good theory', goes the aphorism. Theoretical thinking takes time, but it can be more economical than continual trial and error.

This chapter presents several case studies of development projects using communication. Some of these cases are old, some more recent; some are simple, some complex. For purposes of showing an historical evolution in thinking about rural communication and comparing theory with practice, it is necessary to use examples of projects spread over a long period of time and that are relatively well documented, preferably those for which evaluation data are available. For these reasons, the projects described here do not in any way constitute a valid survey of what is going on in rural communication at present.

Unless otherwise noted, quotations given in the case studies come from publications listed under 'sources of information' for each study. Quotations from publications unavailable to those writing the case studies, but referred to in publications that were available, are identified in footnotes.

Case study 1

Acción Cultural Popular (ACPO): Radio Sutatenza—Colombia

Location: Colombia.

Period of operation: 1947–.

Source of information:

SCHRAMM, Wilbur. *Big media, little media. A report to the Agency for International Development*. Washington, D.C. Department of State, March, 1973. (Schramm quotes from S. Brumberg, *Radio Sutatenza*. New York, International Council for Educational Development, 1972 (Draft report)).

COOMBS, Philip H.; MANZOOR, Ahmed. *Education for rural development—case studies for planners*. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975.

BELTRÁN, Luis Ramiro. Social structure and rural development communication in Latin America: the radiophonic schools of Colombia.¹ East-West

- Communication Institute, The East-West Center, Honolulu (Hawaii). (Paper presented at the Summer Conference on Communication and Group Transformation for Development, 29 June to 11 July 1975.)
- MUSTO, Stefan A. *et al.* *Los medios de Comunicación al Servicio del Desarrollo Rural*. Bogotá, ACPO, Instituto Alemán de Desarrollo, 1971.
- BERNAL ALARCÓN, Hernando. Effectiveness of the radio schools of 'Acción Cultural Popular' of Colombia in promoting the adoption of innovations. Madison, University of Wisconsin, 1967. (Masters thesis.)
- . *Educación fundamental integral y medios de comunicación social; el uso sistemático de los medios masivos de comunicación en programas de desarrollo* Bogotá, ACPC, 1971.

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

In 1947, Father José Joachim Salcedo, curate at Sutatenza, a village ninety miles from Bogotá, began a programme to use radio combined with study groups for adult education. He started with a home-made radio transmitter and three radio receivers. His first listeners were in the valley of the Tenza, an area with 100,000 people, 80 per cent of them illiterate.

Sponsorship

In the early years, Radio Sutatenza received help from the government in the form of equipment and a method for teaching literacy. Unesco sent advisers in the development of broadcasting skills and learning programmes. The main help came from countless volunteer organizers in the villages reached by the radio.

Acción Cultural Popular (ACPO) now receives some public funds and contributions, but it comes close to being self-supporting. The radio network and newspapers carry commercial advertising, and the organization rents out part of its headquarters building and does some commercial printing. However, the programme still relies heavily on voluntary, unpaid helpers.

Clientele and agents

The clientele are the rural adults (the *campesinos*) of Colombia, most of whom are denied public schooling.

As of 1972, Acción Cultural Popular had a full-time staff of 200 in Bogotá, employed 130 people in its editorial and publishing office, maintained 200 field workers, and relied upon hundreds of parish representatives and literacy group supervisors and 20,000 unpaid 'auxiliaries' working in the radio schools.

Scope

ACPO is now Colombia's largest radio network, serving over 20,000 radio schools and hundreds of thousands of students all over Colombia.

Objectives

The stated objectives of ACPO are:

Motivation of the *campesinos* for development.

Human promotion: creation of the 'whole' man, understood in terms of physical well-being, intellect, spiritual and creative senses, and capacity to fulfil social roles.

Integration of the *campesinos* into society through an effort to diminish social distances and to seek to ensure that all citizens have access to and participate in the opportunities and services that society has to offer them.

Organization and development of the community, especially through participation in local organization.

Greater productivity: increased production through new agricultural technologies, increased sales of agricultural products; creation of capital through investments, savings and credit, better use of resources; and, finally, an increased sense of the value of work.

Spirituality of development.

Project design

Although ACPO has on its staff a very capable sociologist-communicator, Dr Hernando Bernal Alarcón, plus several other communication specialists, the central decisions are still taken by ACPO's founder Monsignor Salcedo.

Organization or 'institutional context'

ACPO is an autonomous institution, centrally commanded by a Director-General who presides over three main divisions: cultural, administration and radio-transmission management. The cultural division is responsible for the educational radio programmes, editorial production and operation of the various *campesino* training institutes and regional educational activities.

The media

From its headquarters in Bogotá, ACPO broadcasts nineteen hours a day and feeds much of this programming to three other ACPO radio stations in other parts of the country. In each of these, the programmes from Bogotá account for about two-thirds of broadcast time; the other one-third is provided locally.

The radio school functions at three succeeding levels:

The basic course, primarily for teaching literacy: this lasts six months, with daily broadcast lessons of thirty minutes each. (The enrolment was about 25 per cent of the students for 1972.)

The two-year progressive course: this is intended for farm families who are literate but have not completed primary school. The curriculum in this

course covers five areas: health, literacy, mathematics, economy and work, and spirituality (about 60 per cent of the students).

The three-year complementary course: this is aimed at preparing students to take the school-leaving examination, and the content is the curriculum of the primary school. (About 15 per cent of students.)

Since the learning groups lack trained teachers, the radio teachers speak directly to listeners, trying to explain the content clearly and to structure students' study and practice.

ACPO stations also provide some unstructured educational programming, as well as news and entertainment. The educational programming is directed at adults not in the radio schools and at alumni; the other programming keeps the stations competitive with non-educational broadcasting.

ACPO also publishes the most widely read weekly paper in Colombia, *El Campesino*, written in a style suitable for new literates. In the early 1970s ACPO was publishing each week about 70,000 copies of the newspaper, as well as about 600,000 textbooks annually for the basic and progressive courses in the five subject areas, and about 300,000 copies of books for general reading.

Utilization (diffusion)

ACPO participants are organized into 'radio schools'. The radio school is a group of adults from the same neighbourhood who have decided to study together. The group usually has from six to ten members; sometimes it consists of one family. They are usually brought together by an *auxiliar* (auxiliary), a helper who volunteers to organize the radio school. The *auxiliar* has little or no special training and is not paid. He may have been through a radio school himself. He gets the group together, finds a way to obtain use of a radio, and locates a meeting place (usually a student's home). He serves as group leader until and unless other leadership emerges. He usually listens along with the students and learns with them.

The students meet, listen together to the lesson broadcast, talk it over, and practise if this is called for. Usually each radio school receives one set of textbooks, which is used by all the students.

Research and evaluation

In *Big Media, Little Media*. Wilbur Schramm comments: 'Radio Sutatenza, one of the largest and best known of the rural non-formal projects, has had almost no quantitative research in 25 years.'

Figures on enrolments and examination results for the basic literacy and progressive courses provide one source of data on ACPO. (ACPO publishes quite detailed statistics on its operations.) From 1960 to 1968, an average of 80,000 to 90,000 illiterates were enrolled per year in the basic course. About half of these took the examination, and about 70 per cent passed. During the same period, an average of over 100,000 people per year enrolled in the progressive course; about half of them took the examination, and about 75 per cent passed. Enrolment fell somewhat in later years (enrolment in the basic and progressive courses in 1971 and 1972 was 54,228 and 67,630 respectively).

A study of ACPO (unfortunately not an experimentally controlled evaluation) cited in Schramm ¹ found that radio school students scored higher than non-students on attitude, scale of modernity, innovativeness and integration into rural society. However, these students also had higher incomes and to some extent may have been self-selected from among the more innovative members of the community.

Schramm writes about ACPO:

One can conclude that government financing and government organization is not the only possible way to bring education to rural regions. A dedicated private organization can also accomplish remarkable things, and at some stages in the development process may have advantages over governmental organization in doing so. . . .

In the second place, one can conclude that the study group supported by radio teaching is an effective tool, even with a minimum of trained guidance, without excellent teaching materials, and without the advantage of correspondence study.

Case study 2

Movimento de Educação de Base (MEB): communication for animation and social change—**Brazil**

Location: North-eastern states of Brazil.

Period of operation: 1961–.

Source of information:

BANDEIRA, Marina. MEB: Movimento de Educação de Base. *Report of the Regional Andean Seminar on Non-formal Peasant Education*. Bogotá, IICA-CIRA. 24-30 October 1971. (Serie Informes de conferencias, cursos y reuniones, no. 36.)

MCANANY, Emile G. *Radio's role in development: five strategies of use*. Washington, D.C., Academy for Educational Development, September 1973. (Information bulletin no. 4.)

DE KADT, E. *Catholic radicals in Brazil*. London, Oxford Press, 1970.

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

In 1959, the diocese of Natal, in the state of Rio Grande do Norte attempted to repeat on a very small scale the Radio Sutatenza experience, and with a 250-watt

1. S. A. Musto, *Massenmedien als Instrumente der landlichen Entwicklungsförderung: Wirkungsanalyse von Acción Cultural Popular – Radio Sutatenza (Kolumbien)*, Berlin, Verlag Bruno Hessling, 1969.

transmitter and fifty receivers set up a number of radio schools. The experiment succeeded, and the National Bishops Conference of Brazil became interested in the possibility of extending the system to other states. This was a real possibility, in so far as the Catholic Church already owned 200 of the 1,000 broadcasting stations existing in the country.

In 1960 President Janio Quadros granted funds for an expansion of what was then called the Movimento de Educação de Base through a contract between the Ministry of Education and the Catholic Bishops Conference.

The President's decision was based on general awareness of the extremely backward condition of the peasants in the Brazilian north-east, and the demonstrated potential of radio to disseminate information and education through a vast area.

Sponsorship

MEB was set up as an organization subordinate to the National Bishops Conference, but its financial support came largely from the Ministry of Education. Although it received occasional help from international catholic organizations in Europe, the United States and Canada, the bulk of its funds was of national origin, including eventual contributions from the Ministry of Health.

Clientele and agents

MEB's work was aimed at mobilizing and educating the peasants of the Brazilian north-east, who were illiterate and poor and had very little access to rural schools and to health facilities.

Some of the agents were paid professional educators and some were voluntary workers. At its peak, MEB had 400 salaried full-time workers in the *sistemas* and the national office in Rio de Janeiro. Training and feedback at all levels were constant preoccupations. There were periodical 'study days' for the local teams within their regions. Every year a general meeting of all the local team coordinators was held to evaluate past progress and to outline work for the year ahead. Animators were trained in twelve-day sessions, in which one test for passing measured ability to communicate with the people, judged by the recording of real dialogues. Group techniques were practised intensively during these sessions.

Scope

Around 24 million people inhabit the Brazilian north-eastern region in which MEB concentrated its activities. Before the 1964 change of government MEB operated up to fifty-five *sistemas educativos* (see 'Organization, or 'Institutional Context'', below), a number that dropped to nineteen after 1964.

Although the project was regional in scope, it was considered very important, both by the Bishops Conference and the government, inasmuch as the north-east was a 'problem area' in economic, social and political terms.

Objectives

From its start, MEB established goals that were different from those set by Radio Sutatenza. Conscientization of the people was the main objective rather than literacy or fundamental education alone. According to Marina Bandeira, Executive Secretary of MEB, the word 'conscientization', was coined around 1961-62 by the Young Catholic University Students who were questioning the traditional notion of 'individual morality' as against the concept of 'collective morality'. Conscientization was defined as

the discovery of the self and of the dignity of the human person, together with the realisation that the person, in co-operative association with other persons, can humanize the world.

Another term born at the time was 'politization', defined as

conscious participation in the decisions relevant to the life of the nation, with clear understanding that the local problems cannot be solved without taking into account the more global framework of national and world problems.

Conscientization and politization moved MEB into promoting all kinds of local associative experiences, such as agricultural work groups, soccer clubs and rural syndicates. These concepts also determined MEB's engagement in 'popular animation', understood as

a process of people's promotion through their own action, moving gradually to the structuring of communities which are more and more participative and aware of their own values, resources and needs, and more and more capable of solving their own problems.

These objectives are based on a definite philosophy of social change, explained by Marina Bandeira as follows:

One of the first options we had to make was this: What type of education? For what kind of society? We could start from the assumption that we had already attained a perfectly finished society and it would be only a matter of polishing up some details such as to permit the incorporation into society of the 'poor, ignorant and lazy' who did not know the society's rules of the game. The type of education would then consist in disseminating some techniques, such as how to read and write.

Another hypothesis, however, would be that society is not perfect, finished and complete, but in permanent mutation. At it is today, society is far from permitting the participation of the totality of the population in the same degree enjoyed by the 0.3 % high-income minority. Therefore, we could not take as a dogma the type of society we have but, on the contrary, we must work with the large majority of people so they help us to find a new type of society, more just, in which all people could have access to goods and services, could have a part in creativity and culture, could share in the decisions affecting their own destiny and, consequently, could enjoy some degree of political participation.

MEB gradually came to stress a non-directive concept of education under which *campesinos* were taught discussion and debating techniques so as to enable them

to arrive at their own methods of analysing their reality and their problems. In this, MEB differed from Colombia's ACPO. Says McAnany:

MEB began with the ACPO method and philosophy but within a year or two the emphasis switched so that the monitor as a social catalyst became the center of attention and far less emphasis was given to the radio message. Social animation and a non-directive, non-manipulative approach were increasingly apparent in MEB.

In fact, MEB used the word 'animator' instead of 'monitor' to refer to the local persons who co-ordinated group debates.

Project design

The project was designed by mass media experts—such as Marina Bandeira, MEB's Secretary General, who had had previous experience in journalism and public relations—but also by philosophers, sociologists, pedagogues, economists and anthropologists. MEB's operations, moreover, were continually improved by experience acquired in the field and analysed in regional and national meetings of its staff.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

MEB had a decentralized organization, composed of the following elements: (a) the Regional *sistema educativo*; (b) the local team; (c) the animators; (d) the national team.

The sistema educativo: Wherever MEB operated in the north-east, it always worked with the bishop of the local diocese. Because of this arrangement, the basic work unit was the *sistema educativo*, normally covering one diocese. Each *sistema* included many radio schools. The local team was usually located at the site of the diocese and employed the bishop's own radio station (MEB owned no station).

The local team: The local team was formed by people—in general teachers and eventually trained social workers—chosen by the bishop and trained by MEB. The team planned, executed and co-ordinated the area's basic education programme. Usually located at the most developed centre of the region, the team travelled constantly into the surrounding area to supervise the activities of the radio schools in the communities.

The animators: When the local team visited the rural communities for the first time, they explained MEB to the population and asked them to nominate candidates for the role of 'animators'. To ensure that the candidates they chose could fulfil this role in a non-paternalistic spirit, the local team usually spent several days in these communities. The animators were brought to a central location for training and then returned to their communities to start work. Radio provided motivation and support for the animators' efforts, but was not the central axis of their activities. MEB's basic work developed through the dialogue between the local team and the rural communities.

The national team: Working under the direct supervision of a National Directive Council consisting of nine bishops appointed by the Catholic Bishops

Conference and representatives from the Ministry of Education, the team at MEB's national office in Rio de Janeiro was in charge of organizing new *sistemas*, of selecting and training personnel for the local teams, and of co-ordinating all administrative work.

The national team was divided into two groups: the administrative sector and the technico-pedagogical sector. The latter was composed normally of a philosopher, a sociologist, an economist, an anthropologist, a social worker and a specialist in education.

The national office sent general work policies and guidelines to the *sistemas*, but never programming details, as these were decided on at the local team level.

The media

MEB broadcast its promotional and educational messages through as many as eleven stations in the north-east, some of them belonging the Catholic Church but the majority through ordinary commercial stations from which radio time was purchased. However, it would be misleading to assume that radio was the main medium used. Says McAnany:

The mass medium given greater importance was not radio but printed matter, especially when the new textbook *Viver é Lutar* (to live is to struggle) appeared in 1963.

Marina Bandeira confirms this statement:

For MEB radio is not the axis of the work. Radio serves as motivation and support for the activities in general. The job is based on the dialogue of the local team with the rural population.

Utilization (diffusion)

Utilization rested on four main methods:

Area studies: Every time a new area was being prepared for educational activities, the local teams mobilized the population to participate in an area study, using a simple questionnaire which was gradually improved through experience.

Group dynamics: MEB stressed group techniques not only for selection and training of personnel but also in discussions with the communities.

Problematization of situations: Every effort was made to avoid relying on abstract formulations in the work with *campesinos*. To identify the real problems met by *campesinos* in their daily life they were encouraged to engage in group discussions of a subject of local interest. Another technique used was role-playing, in which one *campesino* would enact, for instance, his behaviour when applying for a job at a local farm and another would take the role of the landlord. These situations were immediately analysed, and many aspects of the life of the *campesinos* emerged from the discussion. The idea was to allow the *campesinos* to see their own situation objectively and also to facilitate the field workers' understanding of the *campesinos'* values, preoccupations and aspirations.

Global approach: MEB tried to develop the general reasoning ability of the peasants; it firmly avoided separating the content of education from the concrete problems of life. Thus, the teaching of techniques such as reading, writing and counting was always connected with matters related to agricultural production, food consumption, health practices and labour legislation. The radio messages, for instance, did not treat basic notions in isolated form, with some minutes devoted to each; instead they were linked under general themes in globalized lessons.

Research and evaluation

It would have been very difficult indeed for MEB to expect to obtain accurate knowledge of the results of its activities. As McAnany says:

MEB began its efforts by attempting to define what the problem of underdevelopment was and not by simply stating the positive goals of development. Leaders of this project felt that unless they and their radio school students could understand the problem or causes of underdevelopment, efforts at social change would be frustrated and symptoms, not causes, would be attacked. MEB saw both the monitor as a change agent and the mass media of radio and printed materials as means of achieving social change but only in so far as it related to the problem of underdevelopment. *Unlike other strategies, the MEB strategy did not see the mass media, etc., as directly causing this change [italics added].*

Nevertheless, MEB made constant efforts to evaluate the efficiency of its operations; for example, it hired a sociologist to carry out a formal survey, comparing radio school members with non-members.

Before 1964 the movement operated as many as 5,000 radio schools, and between 1962 and 1964 as many as 400,000 peasants learned to read. Between 1964 and 1970, however, the number of new literates dropped to only 100,000. We must remember that the new government which took power in 1964 did not encourage *campesino* participation in social change, and this explains the reduction of radio schools in 1970 to only 2,000.

Nevertheless, in 1968 MEB was awarded the Reza Pahlavi Prize by Unesco for the high quality of its work with *campesinos*.

Many staff members, aware that it was hopeless to continue an effort of peasant promotion under the new conditions, left MEB. Marina Bandeira herself left the movement in 1970, after ten years as Secretary General. At present, MEB continues its operations in three Brazilian regions: the north-east, the north, and the centre-west. It concentrates on fundamental education, and radio plays an even less important role than it did before.

The main lessons from the MEB experience are: (a) if *campesino* mobilization for social change is the goal, radio cannot be the main element of the communication strategy, but it can provide a useful supportive tool for encouraging local dialogue; (b) for a popular animation movement, the general political situation of the country and particularly the ideological orientation of its leaders are critical factors; opposition from these sources will only lead to the disadvantage of the *campesinos* whom the movement set out to benefit.

Case study 3

Radio rural forums—India

Location: Pilot project—Maharashtra state; Expanded Project—throughout India.

Period of operation: Pilot Project—1956; Expanded Project—1959.

Source of information:

- BHATT, B. P.; KRISHNAMOORTHY, P. F. Radio rural forums spread throughout India, *Radio broadcasting serves rural development*. Paris, Unesco, 1965. (Reports and papers on mass communication, no. 48.)
- MATHUR, J. C.; NEURATH, Paul. *An Indian experiment in farm radio forums*, Paris, Unesco, 1959.
- SCHRAMM, Wilbur. *Big media, little media. A Report to the Agency for International Development*. Washington, D.C., Department of State, March 1973
- SCHRAMM, Wilbur *et al.* *New educational media in action: case studies for planners*. Vol. 1. Unesco, International Institute for Educational Planning, 1967.
- ROY, Prodipto; ROGERS, Everett M.; WAISANE, Frederick. *The impact of communication on rural development. An investigation in Costa Rica and India*. Hyderabad (India), Unesco and National Institute of Community Development, 1969.

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

The radio-forum idea, which originated and was developed in Canada during the Second World War, was adopted and tried briefly in several parts of India in the early 1950s. But these experiments were not evaluated. Unesco and All-India Radio were interested to know if the techniques used in Canada—radio broadcasts followed by group discussion—would work as well in India with rural audiences who were largely illiterate, rarely exposed to radio and unused to organized group discussion.

Thus, the Government of India and Unesco decided to work together on a pilot project in radio rural forums in 145 villages near Poona in Bombay (later Maharashtra) State in 1956. The area chosen covers about 25,455 square miles and, according to the 1951 census, had a population of 7,194,621. Within it lay 6,547 villages and 107 towns. In 1951, one person in five was considered literate, and there was one radio set per 224.3 population. One regional language (Marathi) is spoken.

The results of the evaluation of this pilot project were so encouraging that the Government of India decided to expand the radio rural forum as widely as possible. However, this expansion proceeded more slowly than expected; not until November of 1959 was the decision to expand taken officially. (Meanwhile, in Bombay State radio broadcasts from All-India Radio, Poona, and some of

the original forums had continued after the end of the pilot project, although there was a lapse between April 1956, when the pilot project ended and all staff except the chief organizer were withdrawn, and January 1959, when the chief organizer set about consolidating and reorganizing existing forums.) For various reasons, expansion nation-wide never reached the goal set for it.

The history of radio rural forums in India thus has two parts: a pilot project in 1956, and a nation-wide 'All-India Radio Rural Forum' expansion project starting in 1959. It is a good example of the difficulties to be expected in moving from pilot to nation-wide scale in a large and diverse country.

Sponsorship

The pilot project was sponsored and financed by Unesco with the active co-operation of the Government of Bombay (later Maharashtra) State. Unesco provided a grant of \$19,000. The Bombay Government provided a chief organizer, five district organizers, and forty part-time organizers. The broadcasts were the responsibility of All-India Radio, Poona. Evaluation was carried out by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay.

The expansion project was sponsored by the governments of the various states involved and by the state broadcasting organizations of All-India Radio.

Clientele and agents

The clientele for radio rural forums were village adults, especially those capable of contributing to progress in the village. Ideally, participants were not to be beyond middle age, and the forum's composition was to reflect the different economic levels of the village. Women were to be encouraged to join, as were Harijans ('untouchables'). According to the evaluation of the pilot project, the forums did achieve a good mix of members from various classes; however, few women took part. In the nation-wide expanded project some special groups were formed for women.

For the pilot project, the professional staff included one chief organizer, a district organizer for each of five districts, and forty part-time organizers. At the end of the pilot project all but the chief organizer were withdrawn for financial reasons: towards the end of 1958 supervision of forums in the five original districts and two new ones in Bombay State was assigned to social education organizers, some of whom had worked part-time on the Unesco project.

In the 145 villages chosen for the pilot project, organizers were assisted by village leaders, who drew up a list of members for each forum. Every forum had a chairman, usually the chairman of the elected village council or the headman, and a secretary-convenor, a literate person (often secretary of the village council or the village teacher) who could keep records and correspond with the radio station. The latter received a small sum monthly to meet the cost of stationery and postage.

Before the pilot project began, it was hoped to provide training courses for district and part-time organizers and for forum officers, but time proved inadequate for this, so training where provided was given individually.

The expansion project called for appointing a full-time chief organizer in every state. A week-long seminar and training course was held at All-India Radio, Poona, in 1959 for thirty-four chief organizers: radio programme officers concerned with radio broadcasts also participated. A second course was held in Hyderabad in 1962. Unfortunately, at the time of expansion not all states had chief organizers. Block development officers and social education organizers working under them were to help organize and supervise forums. Most states participating in the expansion held training courses for these personnel. At the local level, the village extension workers were to lend support. The use of a chairman and a convenor-secretary was maintained.

Scope

The pilot project involved 145 villages in five districts of Bombay (later Maharashtra) State; forums later spread to two additional districts of this state. Each forum had from fifteen to twenty members.

The decision to expand nation-wide was made on the basis of evaluation findings from the pilot project. However, not all conditions of the pilot project were reproduced in the expanded project. Launched in 1959, the expanded project originally called for attaining 25,000 forums throughout India by 1966; this goal was later reduced to 15,000. At the end of the set period over 12,000 forums had been organized, but some were probably not active.

Objectives

The main objective of the pilot project was to test the radio forum idea—radio broadcasts followed by discussion—among largely illiterate village adults in India. Discussion was to increase participants' knowledge and, if possible, result in decisions for improving village life. Decisions, it was hoped, would be followed by action.

The expansion project was intended to spread the benefits shown during the pilot project to villages throughout India.

Project design

As stated above, the idea for the radio rural forum came from Canada; its implementation in India was shaped by Indian social and economic realities. Among these were low literacy, poor transportation and communication, unfamiliarity with the discussion method, social traditions that gave less voice to certain members of the community than others.

The agreement between Unesco and the Government of India was signed in autumn 1955. The pilot project was to begin on 26 January 1956, Republic Day in India, but planning took more time than expected, and the project actually began on 19 February. Preparations had taken about six weeks.

In many respects, the pilot project served as a model for the expanded project, and evaluation of the pilot project included recommendations for expansion. However, the expanded project failed to reproduce some of the

conditions of the pilot project or meet these recommendations. In *Big Media, Little Media*, Schramm writes about the expansion:

Most of the momentum from the Poona project had been lost. Indeed, some of the radios and all of the field staff had been withdrawn as soon as the pilot was over. The expansion was less well financed than the pilot. It had fewer field personnel assigned to it, and it had little of the morale and enthusiasm of the pilot. . . There was less training for the officers, and less attention was paid to making the radio broadcasts fit the needs of a particular agricultural region. Receiver maintenance was not as good, and printed materials tended not to arrive on time. In other words, the pilot project was undertaken with dedication, and in the blaze of attention. The expansion was not. The radio rural forum proved to be not a good enough idea to run itself: it still needs adequate support and adequate staff. And the problem of expanding a pilot nation-wide, especially in a nation as diverse as India, is a problem entirely different from making a successful pilot.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

For the pilot project, two committees provided direction. One, a Central Executive Committee under the chairmanship of the Director-General, All-India Radio, decided on the area of the project, the number of forums, and provision of listening facilities. The second, the Field Organization Committee, brought together directors of education, agriculture and publicity; the deputy development commissioner, and the radio authorities. It selected part-time organizers, allotted centres, drafted general instructions, etc.

In the expansion project, the Central Committee was replaced by a senior officer of All-India Radio, the Director of Programs (Plan Publicity), who co-ordinated forum activities all over the country; he was assisted by a chief organizer. The chief organizers' seminar and training course recommended setting up a Community Listening and Radio Forum Committee in each state. This committee, with a widely representative membership, was to lay down general policy and review the working of forums in the state. In some states such a committee functioned. In others a somewhat differently composed committee supervised forums in the state. Still others had no state committee.

To help All-India Radio plan programmes during the pilot project, a Subjects Committee of experts on village life was established. Under the expansion project this idea was retained, and all stations broadcasting rural programmes had a Rural Program Advisory Committee to advise on all aspects of rural broadcasting including programmes for the rural forums. In later years All-India Radio asked farmers to join the rural Advisory Committees.

For the field personnel involved in the pilot and expanded projects, see 'Clientele and Agents' above.

During the pilot project, the part-time organizers were supposed to set up the forums. However, they proved unable to do so, and this work was taken over by district organizers, who also arranged for a meeting place, helped select participants, and ensured that a radio was available and in working order for forum meetings. In all, the chief and district organizers found it necessary to travel through the forum territory fifteen to twenty days a month during the pilot project.

The media

The main medium was radio. The pilot project used twenty programmes, each one-half hour long, broadcast twice a week for twenty weeks. These programmes covered a variety of topics chosen by a subjects committee: eight programmes on agriculture, one on health, one on health and agriculture combined, one on home management, five on education, three on community development in general, and one on participation in government.

A typical programme included answers to queries from forums on previous programmes, and a treatment of the topic chosen for the programme. Some of the material was recorded in the villages (it was found that inviting villagers to the studio made them self-conscious), and one lesson the pilot project taught was that more material originating in the villages could well have been used. The expanded project continued this content pattern, adding news on action projects undertaken by forums. The forum programmes used a variety of presentation techniques: discussions, interviews, dialogues, dramatizations, features, folk songs and talks.

In both the pilot and expanded projects, queries from forum members played an important role in programming. In 1964, for example, the total number of queries received at all stations broadcasting radio rural forum programmes was 159,737. The radio stations tried to see that these queries were answered on the following week's broadcast.

The pilot project distributed some visual aids—charts and posters—relating to aspects of village government covered in the broadcasts; plans were made to show films as well, but few were actually screened. Under the expanded project, some forums were provided with relevant visual aids.

During the Unesco project, All-India Radio produced a fortnightly programme guide for forum convenors, giving details on programmes and questions to assist group discussion. These guides proved very useful and could have been even more detailed. The idea was developed in the expanded project, and guides produced by All-India Radio or the state governments were sent to convenors. In addition, publications of some talks and discussions broadcast in radio rural forum programmes were distributed to villages, where they were very well received.

Utilization (diffusion)

The radio forum calls for a group of adults to listen to a radio broadcast and then discuss the ideas or issues raised by the broadcast. In Indian villages, it turned out, starting discussions and getting everyone to take part was not always easy. Eventually, however, the forums were, it seems, able to achieve widespread participation. In addition to the development of ideas, there was a great deal of exchange of information; often participants were surprised to discover that a villager they had known well for many years was much more knowledgeable than they had ever thought.

The forum broadcasts did not insist on the necessity for action projects: the expectation was that action would result naturally from discussion. It was found that the presence of a development officer during the forum discussions helped encourage action. Some action decisions were never implemented because

necessary aid (e.g. provision of fertilizer) was unavailable or became available only after interest had been lost. Once again it was shown that communication aimed at bringing about change directly or indirectly is of little value if the tools of change are unavailable.

During the Unesco project, the convenors of each forum kept the minutes of forum discussions, sending one copy to the assistant station-director, All-India Radio, Poona, and another to the district organizer. During this pilot project, a total of 2,061 reports from forums were received by the Poona radio station. The convenor also kept the records—attendance, time of assembly and dispersal, etc.—and reported on these. Similar reporting procedures were used by the expanded project.

Evaluation

Evaluation of the Unesco project was turned over to an independent body, the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay. It was directed by the head of the Department of Social Research and by a visiting Fulbright professor of social research; the director of the Tata Institute acted as chief adviser. The staff consisted of ten interviewers, a field supervisor, a research assistant and a typist. Tabulation was carried out by a chief tabulator, five tabulators, two research assistants and a typist.

The survey set out to examine, in twenty forum villages, whether the radio forum could be used to transmit new knowledge and to study group discussion as a means of transmitting knowledge and as a new institution in village life. The researchers administered a knowledge questionnaire and interview twice, before and after the twenty broadcasts, to forum and control groups. They also observed the forums in action and interviewed forum members four times during the broadcast period. Forum and control villages were divided into those with previous experience with radio and those with none.

The questionnaires, interviews and visits resulted in a number of findings about the forums. Perhaps the most significant of these were the general enthusiasm on the part of participants and the gains in knowledge recorded. As for the latter, the study showed that forum members learned a good deal more than non-forum members; most of the non-forum members who made knowledge gains were in villages with radios and thus could have listened to forum broadcasts. Literates started and finished with more knowledge than non-literates, but in amount of knowledge gained non-literates did just as well as literates, indicating that the forum is an effective means of teaching non-literates. Each radio forum studied reported making a number of decisions for action as a result of discussion; it is unknown how many of these were actually carried out. The survey also indicated that the forums were a valuable means of fostering decision-making in the village and thus served as an important instrument of village democracy. (Detailed findings of the evaluation are given in Mathur and Neurath, *An Indian Experiment in Radio Forums*.)

According to calculations made by Schramm *et al.*¹ the cost of organizing and maintaining each of the Unesco project forums was 416.57 rupees (\$97.48),

1. Reported in *New Educational Media in Action: Case Studies for Planners*, Paris, Unesco, 1967.

or about \$4.38 per meeting. The authors warn, however, that although economies of scale are possible in an expanded project, these costs would probably rise with expansion; during a pilot project many additional costs resulting from the project can be hidden within existing budgets while in a larger project they must be faced.

There was much less systematic research on the expanded forum project than had been done on the pilot project (this research is summarized in Schramm *et al.*,¹ and in Bhatt and Krishnamoorthy, *Radio Rural Forums Spread Throughout India*). However, it is clear that the expanded project never achieved the success of the pilot project.

Schramm *et al.* conclude from the Indian experience that the radio rural forum is a 'potent and promising tool of national and community development', but to achieve its full potential it requires:

1. Adequate organizational and supervisory staff.
2. Commitment and involvement of development field staff at every level.
3. Adequate training for all key officers directly concerned with forums.
4. Radio programmes fitted to local needs and interests; this implies feedback from forums and travelling and recording in the villages by programme staff.
5. Adequate arrangements to maintain functioning radio receivers.
6. Resources to follow up decisions for action.

A comparative experimental study of the impact of different communication media on the diffusion of agricultural and health knowledge in rural populations in Costa Rica and India was made under the auspices of Unesco in 1963-66. For the study of radio rural forums, two forums were organized in two villages near Lucknow and continued to meet twice weekly for one year. Participants were then tested for knowledge gains, as were non-participants in these villages and control groups in different villages. Knowledge changes were greater for both participants and non-participants in radio forum villages than in the control villages. Also, participants and non-participants adopted and did not discontinue more desirable practices than the control groups.

Compared to 'literacy reading groups' and 'rural animation', radio forums were superior in bringing about adoption of both agricultural and health practices, for both forum participants and forum-village non-participants. The study notes: 'When we take into account time and cost inputs when evaluating the treatment's impact, radio forums stand out for their efficiency'.

1. Schramm, *op. cit.*

Case study 4

Pilot project in the use of communication media for adult education—Senegal

Location: Senegal.

Period of operation: 1964–70

Source of Information:

FOUGEYROLLES, Pierre. *Television and the social education of women*. Paris, Unesco, 1967. (Reports and papers on mass communication no. 50.)

Mass media in an African context: an evaluation of Senegal's pilot project. Paris, Unesco, 1973. (Reports and papers on mass communication no. 69.)¹

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

During the 1940s and 1950s, several countries had experimented in the use of mass communication in adult education and rural development. Specialists attending a meeting on the application of new methods and techniques of education to developing countries held in Paris in 1962 agreed that systematic and co-ordinated research on this subject was indispensable. As a result, Unesco's Programme and Budget for 1963–1964 called for the establishment of 'a pilot centre for the production and testing of audio-visual materials and equipment for adult education, including literacy' in Africa.

Senegal, alone among African nations, expressed great interest in co-operating with Unesco on such a venture. Senegal, however, had no television service. To overcome this obstacle, the government agreed to set up an experimental and exclusively educational station covering the capital, Dakar, and its surrounding area.

The project falls into two distinct parts: (a) experimental television, broadcast mainly during 1965 and 1966, but continuing until 1969; and (b) rural educational radio (Radio Educative Rurale), aimed at organized listening groups at the end of 1968 and eventually expanded to cover audiences throughout the country.

Sponsorship

The Government of Senegal and Unesco; the government provided and maintained administrative and technical premises, paid the salaries of Senegalese personnel assigned to the project, and made available broadcasting time on

1. Unless otherwise mentioned, quotations in this case study are all from this work.

Radio Senegal. Unesco provided technical assistance and equipment. Unesco also obtained considerable support, in the form of personnel and equipment, from the French and Canadian governments and from the United Nations Development Programme. Altogether, nine foreign experts—four provided by Unesco, four by France, and one by Canada—devoted a total of about twenty expert-years to the project.

Clientele and agents

For television, the clientele consisted of listening groups of adults, some mixed but most composed of women. At the very end of the project three programmes were made with and for young people. Television audiences were in or near Dakar.

Films were directed at both urban and rural adults.

Educational radio programmes were originally designed for rural audiences in three Wolof-speaking administrative regions which comprise the major part of the *bassin arachidier*, the groundnut-growing area of Senegal.

To serve as discussion leaders for teleclubs, the project used officials of the government agencies Service d'Animation and, later, Animation Urbaine. This choice was not entirely successful, and some teleclubs eventually designated their own leaders from among members. As for the rural radio, the original fifty-seven listening groups were formed and led with the help of Animation Rurale staff, who received training on how to convene a group and conduct a discussion in three-day regional courses.

Scope

The television part of the project was small scale and strictly experimental; from 250 to 255 women were reached directly by 121 programmes.

Radio, however, began with fifty-seven listening clubs in three administrative regions; the potential radio audience was about 800,000. After the project's end, Radio Educative Rurale (RER) spread to many other parts of the country.

Radio Educative Rurale received top priority in that it was launched thanks to an initiative of the President of Senegal and enjoyed his strong support throughout. RER is credited with having played an important role in rural development in Senegal (see 'The Media' and 'Research and Evaluation', below).

Objectives

According to an agreement signed by the Government of Senegal and Unesco on 7 December 1963, the project's objectives were:

- To use modern techniques for the purposes of adult education, bearing in mind the specific requirements of Senegal.
- To evaluate the utility and effectiveness of these techniques, as well as their economic aspects, within the framework of a long-term research programme. This evaluation will make it possible to determine to what extent

the pilot programme will be capable of: (a) accelerating the development of urban and rural adult education; (b) enhancing the effectiveness of adult education campaigns, by making them both broader and fuller; (c) helping to complete and improve the work of educators and monitors in such fields as literacy, vocational training, health education, etc.; (d) facilitating the adaptation of education to the changing needs of Africa.

To serve as a demonstration centre for these techniques for educators and communication media specialists in Senegal and other African countries.

To train the future specialists of Senegal and other African countries in the production and utilization of these methods and techniques.

During the project's first phase (experimental television), some Senegalese tended to regard the project as an activity initiated by Unesco for its own research purposes, while Unesco saw it as an operation requested by the government to be conducted by both parties for mutual benefit. With the launching of educational radio broadcasting, which reached a wide popular audience, this misunderstanding disappeared.

Project design

The project suffered from various organizational problems and, at some points, a lack of equipment and staff; these delayed its implementation and caused several changes in design. (For example, a projected literacy series never got beyond the planning and testing of a few sample programmes.) Nevertheless, the project remained essentially what it set out to be, an experiment in the use of communication media in adult education.

Planning of both the radio and television components of the project benefited from the work of a Senegalese sociologist assigned to the project.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

The project was established within the framework of the Centre de Recherches et de Production pour l'Éducation et l'Information des Masses (CIEM), a body under the authority of the Ministry of Education, created in 1962 to serve as a technical agency for all ministries that might use audio-visual or other innovative methods of communication. In fact, the pilot project more or less swallowed up CIEM; the director of CIEM was appointed director of the pilot project in April 1964, and subsequently the principal members of its technical staff were transferred to the project. While the project's television service was installed in the studios of Radio Senegal, all other services were placed in the premises of CIEM.

The introduction of educational radio posed a serious organizational problem: coordinating the efforts of the various ministries and technical services concerned with radio broadcasting and rural development. This problem was finally solved only through the personal intervention of the President of Senegal, who grouped all concerned services in a new Ministry of Rural Development and established, through Presidential Decree, an interministerial committee for educational radio. This committee was to prepare general guidelines and regulations governing the production, broadcasting, and utilization of educational

radio programmes. Once co-ordination was achieved within the various services concerned with rural development, and between these and Radio Senegal, educational radio broadcasting went ahead quickly.

The media

The media included closed-circuit television, films and radio. These were chosen to reach a Wolof-speaking audience of adults and youth, many of whom were illiterate.

The audiences themselves participated in production for all media. For example, the first programme of each television series included live discussion between women in the studio audience, who revealed their knowledge of, and expressed their interest in, the subject to be treated. In the course of each series, the reactions and comments of the audience after each programme led the producers either to change the content of future programmes or to plan additional programmes. The final programmes of each series, like the initial programme, involved a discussion between several women.

Eventually the plays used to illustrate social issues treated in the programmes were conceived and worked out by amateur theatrical groups and by the teleclubs themselves. Since these plays were in Wolof, a then unwritten language, the producers prepared an outline script, with appropriate transitions, in French; this script was then followed roughly by people appearing in the programme.

It was the Radio Educative Rurale, however, that provided really significant audience participation by giving a voice to the rural peasantry. From the very beginning of RER, broadcasters went into the village to record the views of listeners; at least 70 per cent of RER's programmes were recorded outside the studio. Also, letters to the authorities from radio clubs were encouraged; during January and February 1969, more than 300 letters came in. This flood caused a crisis for RER, which almost crumbled under the pressure applied by officials shocked at the criticism voiced by the peasants. Only the President's continued support and refusal to apply censorship allowed RER to remain in existence, to retain its listeners' faith, and to obtain great popular success. The letters from listening groups elicited by RER broadcasts circulated in a mimeographed, confidential publication to all government officials, including the President. Thus, radio became a tool not only for disseminating information and ideas but also for critical and concerned discussion. In this way, it had a deep impact on government policy.

Since most of the listeners were illiterate, they relied on one member of the community to write letters that expressed the general view. Letters arrived in French and in Wolof, written in the Arabic script learned by the villagers but which the radio team could not read. To handle these, the radio team found an aged Wolof farmer and poet who read the letters aloud into a tape recorder so someone else could translate the spoken Wolof into French. He also read them on the air.

In addition to television and radio programmes, the project also produced two documentary films on the life and problems of a Senegalese village. Unfortunately, these were never seriously utilized or evaluated.

Utilization (diffusion)

Reception of the television broadcasts was carefully controlled. Fourteen tele-clubs were created in social, health or youth centres or in make-shift locations where television could be installed. The audience was formed through existing social groups in the community; the novel medium itself attracted some members. The quality of reception continually posed problems, and a roving maintenance team was kept constantly busy without completely assuring good reception. Another problem was finding group discussion leaders (see 'Clientele and Agents', above). There was adequate feedback of information from the groups, which were visited frequently by the Senegalese sociologist assigned to the project.

Radio is much more mobile than television. The original listening groups, organized by the Animation Rurale, were provided with radio sets, and group listening was followed by group discussions. But as time went on, other listening groups formed in the villages, either spontaneously or with the help of other extension services; these were often less formal. While people also listened individually, group listening seemed to be very popular. Nevertheless in recent years the RER has devoted less effort to formation of listening groups, and this may be reducing the effectiveness of educational broadcasting in the villages.

Research and evaluation

The pilot project was the subject of several evaluation studies.

The inquiries conducted by Professor Fougeyrolles show that the television programmes, according to viewers, helped them to take better care of their homes and children, taught them much about preparing food and personal hygiene, and generally aided them in their role as wives and mothers. Further, 'the influence of television went far beyond the tele-club, thanks to deliberate efforts to disseminate what had been learned, as well as through spontaneous conversations with neighbours and relatives'.

A study of the abortive literacy education broadcasts contains much useful information on providing literacy instruction through this medium in a developing country.¹

As for Radio Educative Rurale, results are evident in the enthusiasm of rural listeners and government officials alike and in the changes in government policies and actions directly attributable to the dialogue established through this channel. In addition, a cost-benefit study of the RER² showed that 'the cost of radio broadcasting as an instrument of rural extension is very low', and that adult education through broadcasting can bring such immediate and long-range benefits as increased production, growth in peasant initiative, and participation in public affairs.

1. *Literacy and Television, Preliminary Results of Research Conducted in the Context of the Unesco Pilot Project* (Report submitted to the Seminar on the Use of Information Media for Educational Purposes in an Urban Environment, Dakar, 27 January–1 February 1969).
2. K. Trabelsi, *The Cost of Rural Educational Radio in Senegal*, Paris, International Institute for Educational Planning (Working document (in French), first version, 5 May 1972).

Nevertheless, television, radio, or any other medium is not self-sufficient; to have an effect, any medium must be coupled with effective community organization.

... the principal lesson of the [television] pilot project, a lesson which is even more evident from the subsequent analysis of educational radio [is that] the effectiveness of the medium of communication depends essentially on the overall organization of services into which it is integrated and the socio-political framework in which it operates.

Case study 5

PEIFEDER—proyecto especial integrado sobre la función de la educación en el desarrollo rural—Peru

Location: Provinces of Cañas and Canchis (and, started in 1973, Anta, Peru).

Period of operation: June 1970 to December 1973.

Source of information: Unesco files and internal reports.

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

In 1969–70 Unesco decided to undertake an experimental, interdisciplinary project in rural development in Latin America. In October 1968 a new government in Peru had initiated a process of structural change which included agrarian, industrial and educational reform. Therefore, Peru seemed a good location for such a project, and an agreement was signed between Unesco and the Ministry of Education of Peru in early 1970.

Originally the project was confined to the two provinces of Cañas and Canchis, in the Department of Cuzco; project headquarters were established in Sicuani, within the project area.

These two provinces have a combined population of about 100,000, 75 per cent of which live in rural areas. Average yearly family income is about \$100. Most of the people speak Quichua. Communication and transportation are difficult.

The Unesco communication specialists involved in planning the project were aware that this area would probably not have high priority in national plans for reform. According to the Director of the Unesco Department of Free Flow of Information and Development of Communication:

The argument was that the use of communication media to create awareness of problems, of possibilities and of needs, might well enhance the implementation of reforms

at a later stage. . . . It was hoped that a location in a township, in the midst of a region where such use of communication had not been tried before, would be an asset instead of a liability. The move was also seen as an attempt to dissociate the new project from the kind of propaganda and consumers' programmes, almost exclusively in Spanish, to which the region had been exposed so far.

Sponsorship

Unesco—three sectors were involved: education, social sciences, and mass communications. Unesco supplied a communication expert and an associate expert, as well as equipment and funds for training. The Government of Peru, through the Ministry of Education.

Clientele and agents

The project as a whole was meant to concern practically the entire population, from children in primary school to out-of-school youth to adults. The communication activities, however, were limited to adults and young people—that is, to out-of-school education.

The main change agents affected by the communication aspects of the project were technicians and other counterpart staff working with the Unesco experts. During the first phase of the project, the two Unesco communication experts ran workshops and courses on educational broadcasting for radio personnel, extension workers and community leaders. Their Peruvian counterpart was sent to Mexico by Unesco for six months' training in the use of media in rural development.

Scope

The project was large-scale in terms of ambition, but limited geographically (to two, and eventually three, provinces). It was considered significant in a national context in the sense that it was to coincide with, and help promote, important economic and social changes. However, the government did not always provide the services it had contracted to donate—e.g. counterpart staff, broadcasting facilities. Also, the reforms involved did not go into effect as quickly as they should have in order to fit with the timing of project activities.

The project was definitely a pilot effort, and when it came to an end the government announced its intention to extend the project's approach to the entire country.

Objectives

The main original objectives were: (a) to improve the existing educational system and services; (b) to promote the active participation of the local population in economic, social, and cultural development.

The project was to include four areas of action: basic education for children; fundamental education for adults; mass communication (addressed to adults and youth); and diagnostic survey and sociological research.

Thus, the project was to be an exercise in well-planned, well-co-ordinated and controlled educational activities in a rural setting. These were to be systematically evaluated to determine their pedagogical value and their contribution to the regional development programme. As far as mass communication was concerned, the project was to concentrate on informing the population about, and awakening interest in, economic and social change.

Project design

Not very clearly defined at the outset, the project underwent a number of structural changes during its operations.

The original aims for the project, as described in a 1969 document, were very ambitious and very diverse—for example, one was to provide complete (five years') primary schooling to all school-age children; another was to revise the school curriculum, methodology, teaching materials, etc. According to a social scientist assigned to the project, these original aims were impossible to meet; they were also vague and 'the project lacked a clear list of problems to be resolved by education, or a precise and detailed operational plan'.

The original project plans were modified by restrictions on personnel financing, and time, but also by the results of a survey of the project area made during the first phase of operations. This survey revealed how serious the project area's problems really were. These included: (a) social stratification; (b) poor land use (most land holdings were too small to provide adequate income because of the high altitude); (c) undernourishment, especially among children; (d) widespread illiteracy (75 per cent); (e) a high school drop-out rate; (f) lack of alternative employment opportunities; (g) an attitude of apathy on the part of the population; (h) insufficient co-ordination between broadcasting agencies in the area, and between these and institutions working for education and rural development.

Even more significant, there was a lack of crucial facilities and infrastructures as well as an absence of evident signs of development activity. While the mass media component was expected to promote widespread acceptance of development action, no such action was in fact taking place.

Project plans were further scaled down as a result of a review conducted by a three-man Unesco team in March 1972. And the project was again modified by the Peruvian Government's decisions to proceed with agrarian reform and, in 1973, to launch a massive literacy campaign. As a result, the operating area of the project was widened to include a third province, Anta, which has a lower altitude and a better climate, and is more suitable for the implementation of agrarian reform than the original project area.

Organization or 'institutional context'

Direction of the project was the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The communication experts worked in co-operation with the Instituto Nacional de Teleducación (INTE), itself part of the Ministry of Education.

During the first phase of the project, co-ordination of efforts with local authorities (educational and other) was difficult and very time consuming; also, counterpart personnel were in short supply. After the restructuring that resulted from the 1972 Unesco mission, co-ordination with local authorities improved somewhat, but it always remained a problem. Another effect of the restructuring was a new agreement between PEIFEDER and INTE according to which the latter organized its activities directly from the PEIFEDER offices in Sicuani. This arrangement, along with the installation of new equipment, allowed the project to increase radio programming to ten programmes a week.

When the Peruvian Government decided to push ahead with agrarian reform, a co-ordinating committee was formed to plan this drive; PEIFEDER was represented on this committee. During the last year of the project, when the government launched its literacy campaign and extended the geographical range of the project, the headquarters at Sicuani were abandoned and a new base was established in Cuzco, considerably farther away from the population concerned; the equipment formerly in use at Sicuani was transferred to Cuzco, to supplement the INTE facilities there.

The media

The project's original plans for the use of media were severely hampered by delays in the arrival of equipment and by lack of access to the two (commercial) broadcasting stations in Sicuani. (A law decreeing that radio stations had to devote one hour a day to educational broadcasting was not quickly implemented, and as late as March 1972 the project had access to only two hours a week of broadcasting from Sicuani.)

Thus, the report on the March 1972 Unesco mission states:

The late arrival of out-door sound-reporting and audio-visual equipment has prevented the team from experimenting in multimedia approaches to community development problems. Neither in theory nor in reality has the communication element up till now advanced further than the project in general, i.e. to the take-off point.

Up to this point, the project was dependent on time granted by the two commercial stations broadcasting from Sicuani. To make matters worse, these operated at low power and thus did not cover the entire project area.

In addition to radio broadcasting, the project (under the direction of the main Unesco communication expert, who remained until the end of 1972) brought lectures, slide and film projections, and folklore events to a certain number of communities in the project area. An attempt to organize a rural theatre group never materialized.

With the arrival of equipment and implementation of the educational broadcasting law, the project was able to extend broadcasting activities. Programmes were produced in both Spanish and Quichua. Some of these were 'discussion' programmes, mainly involving project team members and visitors, which were devoted to local problems; however, according to the Unesco consultant who visited the project in 1973, they seem to have had little direct audience involvement or feedback.

The move to Cuzco further increased broadcasting activities. However, as the consultant cited above points out, while the Cuzco station most often used, El Sur, has 'lively and intelligent programming', its rating is 2 per cent of the audience, made up mostly of the educated and cultivated. 'This kind of station, however willing to accommodate material,' he adds, 'is never likely to make an impact upon the audience in which PEIFEDER is really interested, unless they are listening in a highly controlled situation'—which does not seem to have been the case.

Near the end of its last year of operation, the project organized an international meeting on 'Education Integrated into Rural Development' (held in Lima from 26 November to 1 December 1973). Unfortunately, those attending this meeting did not visit the project area, and the final report is devoted to generalities about rural education rather than concrete observations about specific projects such as PEIFEDER.

Utilization (diffusion)

During the first phase of the project, the project team was to establish listening groups for radio broadcasts. However, the report of the 1972 Unesco mission states: '11-12 listening groups exist on paper, but cannot be expected to operate satisfactorily under the present circumstances.' According to the report of the communication specialist, these groups were activated after the mission's visit and functioned until the end of 1973—that is, until his departure. No data are available on their composition or activities.

Similarly, Unesco files show no data on the number of people reached by the project's radio broadcasts or their reactions to these broadcasts.

Research and evaluation

The over-all design of the project called explicitly for systematic evaluation. However, a solid basis was never laid for such evaluation, partly owing to a lack of counterpart personnel. With the co-operation of the University of Cuzco, questionnaires were prepared and 892 of these were administered in twenty-two communities. But this was only a weak start.

The March 1972 mission's report states:

... a substantial research input is desirable ... primarily in order to establish the permanent feed-back and evaluation system, which requires as a minimum a national counterpart as permanent member of the staff and planned, well-prepared surveys at least two weeks every three months, undertaken by students from the regional University of Cuzco under instruction from the director of the project and the evaluation expert.

The kind of on-going system described here was never developed.

The project as a whole was the subject of two 'informal' evaluation missions, both cited above: the interdisciplinary mission in 1972, and the two-week visit by a Unesco consultant in March 1973. The latter wrote in his report:

The main inferences to be drawn from this project so far seem to be these: (a) that a precise formulation of objectives, and a clear operations plan, are essential from the

outset; (b) that the choice of location is a critical exercise. In a development-oriented programme, the practical results of development, and its potential, have to be clear to the local population. The development message can only be communicated successfully if it can be associated with concrete improvement; (c) that a minimal level of resources, facilities and infrastructures is essential, if something is to be achieved within a reasonable time-scale; (d) that a realistic phasing must be adopted (e.g. in the case of the delivery of equipment). Delays are predictable and must be allowed for; (e) that over-ambitiousness in the framing of a project should be avoided at all costs. Levels of achievement should be carefully related to local constraints and available resources; (f) that the active encouragement of Government authorities, and a sense of priority, is crucial to a project's development, the morale of its agents and its success.

This consultant also wrote:

An experiment—by its definition—is not necessarily a waste if falling somewhat short of its objectives. PEIFEDER falls into this category. It may seem a severe judgement, but if the evidence of the causes of failure are noted as the Peruvian authorities have begun to do, the experiment does not have to be written off.

Case study 6

The Esfahan communication projects for family planning—Iran

Location: Esfahan Ostan (Province) (Iran)

Period of operation: ¹ Mass media project—action programme from 21 August to 21 November 1970 and 22 December 1970 to 20 March 1971, preceded by four months' preparation. Intensive project—about one year, starting in late autumn, 1970.

Source of information:

GILLESPIE Robert; LOGHMANI, Mehdi, *The Esfahan communication projects. Final report (draft)*. Paris, Unesco, May 1972.

1. Four main communication projects were planned for the Esfahan Ostan: (a) a study of the impact of a mass media campaign on family planning in the ostan (the 'mass media' project); (b) an evaluation of the effects of an intensive education effort in family planning in two limited areas using mass media and field staff (the 'intensive' project); (c) a study of the feasibility of using functionaries in a family planning programme; (d) a programme to increase continuing use of the oral pill. Information on the first two projects, those most closely concerned with the use of mass media, is presented here.

The mass media project

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

Esfahan Ostan covers 66,409 square miles and in 1970 had a population of about 2,020,000. Approximately 51 per cent of these people live in towns with over 5,000 population, the largest being Esfahan (population 515,000). Some 18.3 per cent of the population are married women in the reproductive ages of 15 to 45. Literacy rates recorded in 1966 were 32 per cent for men, 19 per cent for women. The estimated birth rate in 1970 was 48 per 1,000, and the death rate 18 per 1,000.

Iran's national family-planning programme began in 1966. Three methods are promoted: oral pills, the IUD and condoms. By August 1970 there were 31,450 recorded new acceptors of birth-control methods in the ostan; in mid-1970, it was estimated, only about 9,600 women were actually using one of these methods.

Sponsorship

The project was sponsored by the Population Council, Esfahan, and financed by the Agency for International Development, Washington. Support was offered by staff members of the Family Planning Division of the Ministry of Health and the Population Council of Tehran.

Clientele and agents

The clientele were women of reproductive age and their husbands.

Under the national family-planning programme, oral pills and condoms were provided by staff in fifty-four health centres in urban areas, by Health Corps teams in one of the Esfahan university hospitals, and at three clinics of the Social Service Organization. The IUD was provided by doctors in eleven clinics in Esfahan. During their initial training period, members of the Literacy Corps, the Extension and Development Corps, and the Health Corps receive instruction in family planning so that they can pass on this information in the course of their other work. In 1968, fifty-three Health Corps women, all located in cities, were assigned to work full time on family planning, spending half their time at clinics and the other half making home visits, and following up visitors who did not return to the clinics. In addition sixteen married women were employed as full-time field workers to promote the use of contraceptives.

The project itself had only one full-time professional staff member (the 'adviser') and a secretary. It was put into effect and evaluated by existing health staff, who were paid on a part-time basis.

Scope

The mass-media project covered all of Esfahan Ostan.

The project provided the basis for expansion of the use of mass media to promote family planning in other ostans of Iran. Ostan directors of family

planning communications attended a two-week training course in Esfahan based on this project. Findings were also presented at several international meetings. A film, *The Esfahan Communication Project*, was made in Farsi and English versions. During 1971, over 150 people visited Esfahan to learn about the project.

Objectives

The objectives of the mass-media project were to increase the acceptance and use of family-planning methods throughout the ostan and to study the effect of a mass media campaign promoting family planning.

Project design

In developing strategy for the mass-media project, five leading advertising agencies of Iran were consulted. Sampling advice was given by staff members of the Iran Statistical Center, the United Nations Development Programme, Esfahan University, and the Unesco Literacy Project, Esfahan. Professor Wilbur Schramm, Director of the Institute of Communication Research, Stanford University, helped the authors of the report in working out a research design.

Media materials were pre-tested before production; technical advice on pre-testing was given by the Schwerin Research Corporation and the advertising firm of Dancer-Fitzgerald and Sample Inc. (see 'The Media', below).

Each month a work schedule was prepared, listing the project objectives for that month. The adviser and health staff were assigned specific tasks, with completion dates, which were broken down into daily work schedules. At first weekly, and later biweekly, meetings were held to discuss progress and problems.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

The project's smooth progress required the co-operation of various ministries and organizations. Free radio time was granted by the Director of the Esfahan radio station after approval was requested from the Esfahan Governor-General and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Permission from the Esfahan Chief of Police was requested to hang banners. The Director of Culture and Arts had to approve showing a Disney film and film clips in cinemas.

Before the project began, a meeting chaired by the Governor-General was held to inform leading businessmen and government officials of the programme and ask for their co-operation. Seven newspaper publishers and reporters were invited to a meeting to discuss how the press could co-operate with the project.

The media

Before the mass-media project began, a survey was made of 1,000 men and women in the ostan to determine exposure to the mass media as well as to obtain baseline information on family-planning knowledge and practice. Of the people

interviewed, 68 per cent owned radios and 74 per cent said they listened to the radio. There were two major newspapers and five local papers; 9.4 per cent of the respondents said they read a newspaper; 36 per cent said they watched television; 57 per cent said they received letters at home, and another 23 per cent received them through friends or a local shop. There were fourteen cinemas in the *ostan*, all but two in Esfahan City. About 8 per cent of the couples interviewed had gone to the cinema within the three months preceding the interview.

The media materials pre-tested included ten one-minute radio spots, twenty-four short messages about family planning, eighteen posters, nine pamphlets, and four leaflets. Six field workers were trained for this work. The materials were tested with 119 women, mostly between ages 25 and 30 and having an average of four children; 13 per cent were literate. They were selected at random from women going to health stations in Esfahan City. From the information gained through surveys and pre-testing, campaign materials were selected and a campaign slogan was developed along with a visual symbol and a sound symbol; the slogan and one or both symbols were used on all materials during the campaign.

Preparation of campaign materials took four months. These included, for radio: spots, announcements, dramas, discussions, news items, interviews and talks. Mailings were prepared for 300 *élites* (professionals and religious, business, and government leaders); these consisted of an explanation of the population problem, supporting statements by the Shah and Moslem leaders, leaflets on contraceptives, and a letter about the family-planning communication programmes. A mailing was also prepared for 1,500 women recently having given birth; it included a covering letter (with a coupon to give in at the clinic during the first visit), leaflets on the oral pill and IUD, a return postcard, and two 'introductory cards for friends'.

In addition, 50,000 copies of the poster chosen, and 200 of the banner, were printed. The poster was used in an advertisement placed in the two leading newspapers. Newspaper releases on the project and national programme were prepared, and 30,000 inserts aimed at men describing the population problem and contraceptives and listing clinics were printed for magazines and newspapers. A film clip lasting 90 seconds was made by a film company in Tehran specializing in advertisements shown in cinemas, and fourteen prints were prepared. The project also obtained five 35-mm prints of a Disney film on family planning. Finally, a taped announcement lasting 18 seconds was made for the sound truck, and twenty visual exhibits to place on a table or wall were prepared.

Utilization (diffusion)

During the first three months of the mass-media project, only radio was used. During this period, a one-minute spot was on the air three times daily, at 11 a.m., noon and 6 p.m.—hours the survey had indicated were the most suitable. The spots were changed monthly. At the end of each, post box and telephone numbers were given where listeners could get further information; telephone service was provided ten hours a day.

Five- or ten-minute announcements by various officials were broadcast about once a week between 6 and 7 p.m.

A month's interval separated the first three months from the last three; during these last three months all available media were used: banners, posters, mailings, one-page advertisements placed five times in the two leading newspapers, an insert in other papers and magazines. About fifty news items related to the project appeared in the newspapers. The sound truck was used only during the last month, in Esfahan City.

Research and evaluation

For research, see pages 51 and 52.

To evaluate the project the following were used: acceptance at clinics, comparison of results with the family-planning programme in other ostan, pre- and post-campaign surveys, returned coupons and cards from mailings, telephone calls and letters requesting information, a man-on-the-street survey, and 'diary writers'. The latter were literate men and women who recorded daily what they heard people saying about family planning. Evaluation was aimed at determining changes in practice and knowledge of family planning, the impact of individual media, and the discussion generated by the campaign.

Judging from clinic records, the net increase for all methods of contraception during the six months of the project was 64 per cent. In other ostan rates of acceptance of new and old patients also increased during this period, but not as much.

A total of 1,000 men and women in the ostan were interviewed before the project and 968 afterwards. Both groups were probability proportional samples, comparable except for a slight urban bias in the second. The post-project survey showed significant increases in knowledge, acceptance and practice of family planning. (Detailed evaluation results are given in the draft final report.)

Although these results were encouraging, the authors warn that there is no guarantee that those accepting or even practising birth control will do so steadily and long enough to avoid producing large families during their reproductive years. Continued practice will require more widely spread contraceptive sources, especially in rural areas; effective distribution of contraceptive devices; and continuing information and persuasion.

As for the media, radio had the greatest impact on developing awareness and increasing acceptance of contraception. Nevertheless, during the campaign 82 per cent of the women going to the clinics said they had heard about contraceptives from friends and neighbours; 39 per cent said this was the most important source of information. Of the estimated 1,100 women receiving letters, 4.2 per cent returned coupons when they visited a clinic; introductory cards were turned in at clinics by 6.3 per cent (these results were better than expected). (Results for all media are found in the draft final report.)

Total cost of the project is given at \$18,678 (this does not seem to include the salary of the adviser and his secretary). The report states: 'The cost per acceptor cannot be precisely determined. The labour and material costs for developing the programme were high but cost to expand the project will be relatively low'. If the project resulted in a 40 per cent increase in acceptances, the authors estimate, the cost per new acceptor was about \$2.75; a campaign using media developed for the project in another ostan would cost about \$1,540,

or less than \$1 per new acceptor with a 40 per cent increase in accepters.¹ However, the costs indicated here seem to be only those of an expanded use of media, not the cost of providing the better and more widespread family-planning services referred to earlier as being necessary to a truly effective campaign.

The intensive project

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

See 'Genesis; Background; ...', page 46. This project was designed to determine what an intensive promotional effort could achieve in changing family planning knowledge. Two areas were chosen for the project: a densely populated area within Esfahan City, and a rural area of sugar-beet farmers living on small plots of land 20 kilometres north-east of Esfahan City.

Sponsorship

See 'Sponsorship', page 46.

Clientele and agents

See 'Clientele and Agents', page 46.

The project made a special attempt to use as change agents functionaries such as village leaders, *mullahs*, midwives, school-teachers, and Literacy Corps members and other opinion leaders—for example, satisfied contraceptive users and local gossips. These people were invited for a one-day orientation programme at the Health Department.

Scope

See 'Genesis; Background; ...', above. The urban area had a population of about 9,400, and the rural area about forty-nine villages with 8,500 people. The total number of households for each area was 2,597. The target group consisted of all adults of reproductive age in these two areas.

The project was a research effort, designed to gather information rather than to serve as a model for expansion.

Objectives

The project's objectives were

to identify and involve in the programme both functionaries and other opinion leaders, to have the field workers contact all families in the area at least four times during a

1. Compare with Schramm's comments on expansion of the India radio forum project, page 31.

year, to increase the boomerang effect, and if necessary to bring the family planning services to the door of the couple.

Project design

The project involved two elements: intensification of media exposure and a baseline survey of all the households followed by three repeat visits for interviews. The survey and first two repeat visits were from two to three months apart while the fourth visit came six months after the third; thus the entire project took about one year. A nurse accompanied the interviewers in the villages on the last visit and dispensed pills and condoms to women who wanted them.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

The surveys and follow-up interviews were carried out by fifteen Health Corps women who had had previous interviewing experience. This work was organized by three male supervisors who divided the areas into sections. The supervisors assigned each interviewer about 180 households with 200 families. After each visit the supervisor tabulated results by rural and urban sections and submitted a report on progress and problems in his sections. At the beginning of the project field workers, supervisors, the Deputy Director of Health and the adviser met together every two or three weeks; thereafter they met monthly.

The media

The project began when the action part of the mass-media project described above was half completed; thus, the target group had already been exposed to three months of radio programming. The media that could be intensified in the two project areas were the sound truck, posters, banners, exhibits and leaflets (all designed for the mass media-campaign).

Utilization (diffusion)

No information available.

Research and evaluation

For Research, see also 'Project Design', 'Organization or 'Institutional Context'' and 'The Media', above. All evaluation data come from the baseline survey and follow-up visits. The baseline survey covered, for each household, the age of the wife, the number and sex of children, current practice of contraception, ambivalence towards family size, stated ideal size, exposure to family-planning information through mass media and functionaries, pregnancy data, etc. During subsequent visits the interviewers sought to discover if ideas or

attitudes had changed and why. Finally the response reactions to the mass media campaign had been noted. The campaign had changed the campaign. The mass media campaign had changed the mass media campaign. The mass media campaign had changed the mass media campaign.

The findings were shown that 42 per cent of the rural women had 12 per cent of the urban women had heard the family planning message on the radio. These figures increased to 26 per cent and 34 per cent respectively in the third year. The third year 42 per cent of the women knew the mass media campaign slogan.

Second special therapy classes for adults in urban areas had received registration, family size, and contraceptive education. The Family Care members proved the most effective intermediaries. In this area school teachers and mothers were the most effective intermediaries. 22 per cent of the women had received family planning with them.

Although the target groups became aware of the values of family planning and contraception as a result of mass media and the efforts of family planning, they do not seem to have had much effect on actual acceptance and practice. In the rural area, the major change in contraceptive practice occurred through changing family planning centres in the area. In the urban area, the target population is centers for the majority of the 12-17 population. The percentage of women in the rural target group using oral pills increased from 5.2 per cent to 11.4 per cent after the first year, while 12.2 per cent increased from 2.3 to 14.1 and 15 percent to be specified. In the urban region target group contraceptive practice did not change much over the period studied. The use of withdrawal increased slightly, but couples were not motivated to accept any of the oral pill or IUD.

Case study 7

National radio study campaigns for civic education—United Republic of Tanzania

Location: United Republic of Tanzania

Period of operation: 1972-

Source of information:

Haas, Roger L. *What we think: Time for thinking*. An evaluation of a radio study group campaign. Institute of Adult Education, University of Dar es Salaam, Spring 1973.

- 1961, David L. *Strategies in rural education: health education in Tanzania*. Institute of Adult Education, University of Dar es Salaam, August 1961.
- 1962, David L. *Tanzania: Three Years for development: the Tanzania national youth survey*. Cambridge United Kingdom: International Education College, 1962.

General background, reasons for the project

The broad scope of Tanzania's activities in adult education have been closely tied to her social, economic and political systems, especially to her own forms of socialism and rural development, which put much emphasis on self-reliance.

The two leading groups for adult education were formed in 1961 by two institutions: the Cooperative Education Centre (C.E.C.) in Moshi for co-operatives, and the Institute of Adult Education (IAE) in Dar es Salaam for English language, news and extension. In 1962 these two institutions became not separate the results of their experiments and published the idea of self-group learning to other institutions. An Adult Education Advisory Committee in Dar es Salaam—already in existence for some years and representing all regions and economic activities—set a working plan for adult education which, with various national help, the executive did much to foster the concept of rural study groups. In 1962 the United Republic of Tanzania's second Five Year Development Plan was introduced, with co-operation with the national groups were in Tanzania) were the subject of talks around run by C.E.C. about 150 groups and IAE (about 100 groups). Activities in this campaign helped in developing the large nationwide efforts that followed in 1963, *Education for Work* (The Change is Yours) on the necessity and content of education in connection with the 1963 campaign in 1963, *Wapata Wa Faraja* (Take the Reins) in connection with the celebration of the country's third anniversary of independence, and in 1971 *Muaji Mpya* (Man is Flower) for health education.

Spontaneous

The 1963 campaign was sponsored by the Institute of Adult Education, the Planning Commission, T.A.N.I. (the country's largest political party), the National Science Department of the University of Dar es Salaam, and the Adult Education Division of the Ministry of National Education.

The 1964 campaign was sponsored by the Institute of Adult Education, the Cooperative Education Centre, the Adult Education Division of the Ministry of National Education, and the Ministry of Agriculture.

The 1971 campaign was founded as well by the Tanzania International Development authority, which donated about £20,000. It was sponsored by the Institute of Adult Education, the Ministry of Health, and United Workers (Health Education Unit), the Adult Education Division of the Ministry of National Education, T.A.N.I., and the Prime Minister's Office (Rural Development Division).

Clientele and agents

The radio campaigns were aimed at adults throughout the country, but especially those in rural areas. Many of these people were illiterate (in 1970, adult illiteracy in the United Republic of Tanzania was estimated at over 70 per cent, higher in rural areas).

The agents used included personnel of the Institute of Adult Education and the Ministry of National Education, district adult education officers, and locally recruited group leaders.

In the 1970 campaign a series of short training courses was held for study group leaders, who were mainly primary school head-teachers and adult education officers; these people organized and publicized courses as well as serving as leaders. The largest number of groups was registered in regions where pre-campaign training courses had been offered to study group leaders.

Planners of the 1971 campaign were influenced by the crucial role trained study group leaders had played in 1970. The Institute of Adult Education and the Co-operative Education Centre each developed a two-stage training programme: local organizers were trained to prepare study group leaders. The CEC used the two instructors it already had attached to each of eight 'wings' in eight areas of the country; these instructors worked with the co-operative education secretaries of the unions. They designed a training programme for group leaders which was carried out by the co-operative education secretaries and financed locally.

The Institute of Adult Education used district adult education officers of the Ministry of National Education, who were trained in the idea and techniques of the study group method in six regional seminars organized jointly by the institute and the ministry. These officers then trained group leaders, among whom were teachers, TANU officials, farmers, office workers, civil servants, artisans. Some 1,854 group leaders were trained in this fashion.

For the 1973 campaign over 75,000 study group leaders were trained between December 1972 and April 1973. First, regional literacy training teams were enlarged to include officers from the Ministry of Health and other institutions and were given orientation on the study group method and the health campaign in seven regional seminars. Then these teams went to the districts, where they held about seventy seminars for district training teams. The district teams included district adult education officers, TANU officials, district medical officers, agricultural officers, and people from voluntary agencies. Finally, the district teams held about 2,000 seminars, lasting two days each, to train study group leaders.

Scope

The three campaigns were all nation-wide in scope. The 1970 campaign involved 163 registered listening groups, but the audience was no doubt much larger: 20,000 copies of the study book were distributed.

The 1971 campaign involved 2,000 officially organized groups, with about 20,000 members.

The 1973 campaign was designed for about 1 million (750,000 in co-operative villages and 250,000 in six districts in the forefront of the national

literacy campaign). However, it actually reached nearly 2 million Tanzanians (although about half of the groups formed could not receive the radio programmes and so used only printed materials).

Thus, the first two campaigns were essentially pilot efforts, while the third was large-scale.

The radio campaigns received top priority, as in fact does adult education in general in the United Republic of Tanzania. The year 1970 was proclaimed Adult Education Year, and the President has consistently stated that adult education is a first step in development. The 1973 campaign benefited from two national speeches made by the Prime Minister stressing the importance of full participation.

Objectives

The objectives of the 1970 campaign were to teach about the machinery of government—how Parliament and local councils work, what the President does, how election campaigns are run, how to vote; and to stimulate informal discussion about the meaning of this machinery and the duties and responsibilities of elected representatives of the people.

The objectives of the 1971 campaign were to create a deeper sense of national awareness and, by tracing the country's development from the past to the present and highlighting the achievements since independence, to give people a good reason for regarding the tenth anniversary as a 'time for rejoicing'.

The 1973 health campaign had three objectives:

Provide information about the symptoms and prevention of specific diseases.
Increase awareness of measures that groups and individuals can take to improve their own health.

Encourage use of newly acquired reading skills by providing suitable follow-up written materials to recent participants in the national literacy campaign. All campaigns stressed use of the study group concept. Thus, they were based on the assumption that if learning is to occur, there must be dialogue not only between the group leader and group members, but also among all members of the group. The group leader's role was to stimulate and co-ordinate the members' study, not to direct it.

The 1973 campaign differed from the others in the emphasis it placed on action as a direct result of discussion. Group members were encouraged to organize for work that would result in improved health for the individual and the community.

Project design

Many countries using the radio forum concept for adult education have tried to make these forums into a continuing institution; the United Republic of Tanzania, instead, has chosen to adopt the 'campaign' approach, providing a separate campaign for each theme. This approach calls for close co-ordination between all participating parties and careful planning before the beginning of each campaign.

To provide for co-ordination, before each campaign began a co-ordinating committee was formed to plan activities and oversee production of media materials. On these co-ordinating committees sat representatives of various institutions and agencies concerned. Planning began well in advance: nine months before the first broadcast for the 1971 campaign, and eighteen months ahead of time for the 1973 campaign.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

See 'Sponsorship' and 'Project Design' above.

The media

The principal medium for all three campaigns was radio. Radio broadcasts were supplemented with printed materials and publicity of various sorts. Broadcasts and materials were all in Swahili.

In the 1970 campaign, the planning committee also served as production and editorial committee for the booklet/study guide on which radio scripts and all subsequent materials were based. Radio broadcasts (twelve in all) included a large portion of interviews with officials and commentaries on actual events. Time was allowed each week to answer listeners' questions on previous programmes.

The 1971 campaign used ten radio programmes, each lasting one-half hour, a textbook which supplemented the broadcasts, a study guide indicating to groups how to organize and carry out a study group, and a group leader's manual. Pre-campaign publicity included an information kit for education officers to help them present a talk or study session on the campaign (including pocket notes, an introductory tape, and general advice), press and radio coverage, posters and exhibitions.

The 1973 campaign involved twelve radio programmes of one-half hour each, broadcast weekly and each repeated twice; a text printed in large print to serve as reading material for new literates; a study guide; and a group leader's manual. Publicity included radio and press coverage, widely distributed posters, two national speeches made by the Prime Minister, and a cloth printed by the Friendship Textile Company with designs emphasizing aspects of the campaign.

Utilization (diffusion)

It is, of course, impossible to determine how many Tanzanians listened to the radio broadcasts on their own initiative, without joining a registered group. The radio audience in the United Republic of Tanzania is estimated at 8 million, out of a population of 13 million. However, all three campaigns were based on the principle of learning through group discussion; thus, the media were truly utilized only by those gathered in discussion groups.

In the 1970 campaigns most of the reported listening groups received the radio broadcasts without difficulty; a few groups met without a radio and used only printed materials as a basis for study. Distribution of printed materials,

instead, posed many problems. Some groups requesting materials through the mail received them just before the series of broadcasts ended.

An ideal group had a discussion leader, a chairman (sometimes the same person), and a secretary who kept attendance records and took notes on discussions. The meeting began with the reading of a report of the previous week's discussion and introduction of this meeting's topic. Next, the group heard the radio broadcast. Then the chairman read out the relevant questions indicated in the study booklet and discussion began. Preparing for the meeting by reading the printed materials proved very important—the more the leader and participants prepared, the better the discussion. About one-third of the groups surveyed reported additional learning activities—e.g. inviting a local speaker.

In the 1971 campaign, study groups were supervised by the district adult education officers and IAE staff, but these personnel proved inadequate to cover all groups. This campaign also suffered from problems in distribution of printed materials. An analysis of attendance records shows that of group members nation-wide, 61 per cent were men and 39 per cent women, and that the average attendance rate for all groups was 65 per cent. Group members were fairly evenly distributed in all age brackets except those over 50. Seventy-two per cent were farmers—the prime target audience.

The 1973 campaign was planned for about 1 million adults but actually involved about 2 million. About half the study groups never used the radio broadcasts because they lacked a radio or experienced poor reception; these groups depended entirely on printed materials. As in 1970 and 1971, some of the groups formed were too large to allow everyone to participate in discussion (it was impossible to turn away enthusiastic would-be participants), and printed materials were sometimes in short supply. On the other hand, the 1973 campaign resulted in an enormous amount of action—e.g. construction of hundreds of thousands of latrines, provision of safe water, diagnosis, control and prevention of malaria and tuberculosis.

Research and evaluation

There is no evidence of pre-campaign research, but of course those planning the radio campaigns had access to information from Radio Tanzania, the Institute of Adult Education, the Co-operative Education Centre, and the Ministry of National Education as well as to the experience of previous campaigns (see 'Genesis; Background; ...', page 53).

Evaluation became more complex with each campaign. In 1970 it consisted of an analysis of weekly reports submitted by groups (220 reports from 70 groups), and visits to selected groups. At the end of the campaign a survey by questionnaire covered twenty-six group leaders. And a competition offered prizes of books to listeners who successfully answered some simple questions included in, or about, the last two programmes.

As far as media were concerned, about two-thirds of the groups surveyed found the radio programmes at the right level of difficulty, while 23 per cent found them too difficult. The study booklet was found useful by 98 per cent of group leaders, though 31 per cent judged it too difficult for most members to read themselves. As for the textbook, problems were inadequate supply, the

large number of illiterate members who could not read it, and the fact that some found the questions for discussion too difficult.

Evaluation for the 1971 campaign was planned from the first stages of the campaign; wherever possible, evaluation procedures were integrated with everyday administration. Sources of data were: accounting records, training reports from staff, participant reaction forms (for group leader trainees), class and group registration forms, a cognitive knowledge test, evaluation seminars, and a questionnaire for district education officers.

The cognitive knowledge test was a ten-item, multiple-choice quiz developed after pre-testing and analysis. The intention was to administer it to fifty groups in ten areas before and after the campaign; in fact, only seventeen groups (with ninety-eight members) submitted to both pre-campaign and post-campaign testing. Where group members were illiterate, questions were read out loud to them individually; literate group members filled in the tests themselves. Results showed an over-all gain in knowledge of 11 per cent.

Two evaluation seminars were held, one with district education officers, and another with organizers from the Institute of Adult Education, the Co-operative Education Centre, TANU and Radio Tanzania. These proved very useful in analysing the problems met in the campaign.

The 1973 campaign used interim evaluation reports, based on short evaluation tours, and more detailed supervision reports filled in by local supervisors after visits to 2,131 groups. In addition, a short thirteen-item multiple-choice test was administered orally by study group leaders at the beginning and again at the end of the campaign. Adult education classes studying some subject other than health education were used for control groups. The average gain in knowledge in the health study groups tested was 20 per cent: among the control groups it was 15 per cent (but it proved almost impossible to find control groups whose members had been isolated from the radio study campaign). In addition, a pre- and post-campaign survey was made of health practices in eight villages. Scoring on a series of eleven observable health practices showed a 15 per cent gain after the health campaign. The largest change in the score came from digging and construction of pit latrines and clearing vegetation from around houses. The *per capita* cost of the campaign, for 2 million people, is estimated at 1.4 Tanzanian shillings, or \$0.14.

On the basis of these three campaigns, it would seem that the radio study group method is effective in the United Republic of Tanzania in reaching rural adults who have not been reached by traditional school or adult education efforts. It appears a valuable way of involving rural populations in development through an increase in understanding and change in attitudes and behaviour. The method is flexible (many subjects can be handled), and it is economical. Two major problems remain. One is distribution of printed materials—this requires a long planning and preparation period before a campaign is launched and close co-operation between preparing bodies and field organizers. The second is feedback and follow-up—some means of answering questions and supplying additional information is required.

Case study 8

The Fogo Island process: user-oriented communications systems—Canada

Location: Fogo Island, Newfoundland, Canada.

Period of operation: 1967–.

Source of information:

Fogo process in communication. *A reflexion on the use of film and video-tape in community development*. Memorial University of Newfoundland, Extension Service. n.d.

WILLIAMSON, H. Anthony. The Fogo process. User-oriented communications systems and social development: the Canadian experience. (Summary of Presentation at Unesco Meeting on the Planning and Management of New Communication Systems, Paris, 8-12 October 1973.

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

Fogo Island, 40 miles north of Gander, lies off the north-west coast of Newfoundland. According to Williamson, this is a region which, along with Labrador,

can be described as a developing region within a developed nation. [Here] . . . isolation, the lack of infrastructure, poor communications, underdeveloped resource-based local economies, and low levels of formal education in most of the rural regions reflect in microcosm the macro problem of many developing nations.

In 1967 the island had a population of 6,000 living in ten isolated communities. Once a prosperous fishing and supply centre, Fogo Island was in economic decline, with 60 per cent of the population receiving government welfare payments. The islanders feared they would be forced to resettle in more prosperous areas; they had formed an Improvement Committee and had requested Memorial University's Extension Service to sponsor a conference at which island residents could examine their situation together. The island already had a very capable resident extension service field representative, a native of Fogo who knew the people well and was skilled in community development work.

Also in 1967, the National Film Board of Canada began its 'Challenge for Change—*Société Nouvelle*' programme. The idea behind this programme was to apply audio-visual techniques to improving underdeveloped and disadvantaged communities, helping solve problems of a particular area or group, and aiding societies undergoing social change. These goals were to be achieved by improving communications where meaningful exchanges were traditionally at a minimum—for example, between different social or religious groups in the community or between communities and regional and national government. The

Fogo Island project, carried out in co-operation with Memorial University Extension Service, was one activity in this programme.

Sponsorship

For the Fogo Island project, the Extension Service, Memorial University of Newfoundland, and the National Film Board of Canada ('Challenge for Change—*Société Nouvelle*' programme). (Subsequent projects with film and video tape in Canada and the United States using the Fogo Process were financed by the Donner Canadian Foundation, the Federal Department of Communications and Bell Telephone Company of Canada, and the United States Government).

Clientele and agents

The clientele for the services of Memorial University's Extension Service are the slightly more than 500,000 people living in Newfoundland and Labrador; 300,000 of these people live in coastal villages of 1,000 population or less, many of which are not served by roads and do not receive broadcast television or radio. Their cultural heritage is Anglo-Saxon, American Indian and Eskimo. In many ways the Fogo Island community was a microcosm of Newfoundland and Labrador.

The main objectives of Memorial University's Extension Service are 'to develop and design adult learning, community development, and continuing education programmes for the isolated and rural population of Newfoundland and Labrador'. It works through a network of field workers who live in the rural regions (twelve in 1973).

The team for the Fogo Island project consisted of the resident field worker, a film producer from the Canadian Film Board and a film crew. Immediately after the Fogo Island project the Extension Service created its own permanent film unit, which works through extension field workers. The locally resident field worker remains an essential element in all Memorial University projects using the Fogo Process.

Scope

The original project was limited to Fogo Island. But the 'Fogo Process' developed during filming and community discussion there (see 'Media' below) has had wide use elsewhere. In the spring of 1968 a workshop was held at the Memorial University in co-operation with the National Film Board on the use of films in community development; participants came from all over Canada and the United States. Later in 1968 the Extension Service film unit undertook another project at Port au Choix in the Northern Peninsula of Newfoundland; this was followed by other applications of the Fogo Process in Canada and in the United States. The development of practical video-tape equipment gave a new dimension to the Fogo Process; by 1970, Extension Service field workers were equipped with video equipment which community groups were taught to

use themselves. Outside of North America, user-oriented communication project have been put into effect in the United Republic of Tanzania, Peru and elsewhere.

Objectives

The general objectives of the Fogo Island project were an amalgam of those of the 'Challenge for Change—*Société Nouvelle*' programme and of Memorial University's Extension Service (see 'Genesis; Background; ...' and 'Clientele and Agents', above); thus, community development aided by locally produced audio-visual materials (in this case, film).

The specific objective of the Fogo Island project, at least initially, was to make films of the islanders themselves around the issue of resettlement. According to the booklet *Fogo Process in Communication*, however: 'What evolved, *though not intended*, was a new communication technique which acted as a social catalyst for community development' (italics added). If this is the case, the Fogo Island project seems to have begun with a vaguely formulated goal and resulted, somewhat to everyone's surprise, in a new technique for community development.

Project design

The Fogo Island project seems to have been designed on the spot, through a flexible exchange among the island residents, the field workers, and the film producer.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

The use of films in the Fogo Island project was only one element in a programme for change. According to Williamson the Fogo process:

was one dimension of an overall development thrust which included organized local leadership, several government agencies and educators. The prime role of the Fogo Process was to clarify attitudes, focus local, public and government attention on key problems and to accelerate consensus, decisions, and actions. If continued local effort, educational and governmental support were to cease, then the communications process will have done little more than to raise expectations beyond any means to satisfy them.

Thus, the project showed that the production and screening of films can arouse interest and help people formulate goals and action programmes, but any project using the process must also be organized so that media products reach the attention of those who set policies, make plans, and design programmes affecting the people covered by the project. In the case of the Fogo Island project, access was facilitated by the fact that the 'Challenge for Change—*Société Nouvelle*' programme was working in co-operation with seventeen federal government departments and agencies.

The media

On Fogo Island the medium used was 16-mm film. Some twenty-six films were produced. Taken as a whole, the films attempted to give a comprehensive picture of the island as the islanders themselves saw it. They focused on local personalities and dealt not only with problems and issues but also with everyday activities, with positive as well as negative aspects of island life.

The films were shot by professionals; a crucial role in producing them was played by the Extension Service field worker, who was locally known and trusted and who served as social animator and interviewer. Both the film crew and the animator kept a neutral attitude throughout, going no further than to suggest general themes. Final editing power for each film lay with the people appearing in it; except at the very beginning, a film was never shown to anyone else until those appearing in it had given their permission. Once this approval was obtained, the film was shown to other representative members of the community, who decided if it accurately reflected their attitudes. The community also had to decide if the total package of films dealing with it depicted the people's lives as they perceived them before it could be shown to other Fogo Island communities or to a wider audience.

In theory, the films themselves were considered unimportant; it was the reactions and actions they helped initiate that counted (see 'Utilization' below).

After the initial project, a series of follow-up films was made to indicate, both to islanders and to outsiders, what impact the project had had on the island. In autumn 1968 films were made of the first longliner launching, and from then on all significant events on the island were filmed; the result is a film analysis of a community in change over a period of several years.

Utilization (diffusion)

Utilization is the key element in the Fogo process; in fact, the process is one of initiating community action, not of film-making. The films themselves have no value until they are properly screened and until the reactions to these screenings result in increased self-knowledge and in positive decisions and action.

Thus, distribution of the films—in effect, deciding who should see them and under what conditions—is a vital part of the process. In the Fogo Island project, distribution was the responsibility of the extension service field worker. Using his knowledge of the island and of community development processes, he chose audiences of people with the resources and potential for dealing with the particular problems or situations covered by the films. One important result of these screenings was that opposing factions of the community could be exposed to, and appreciate, each other's views without the strain of direct confrontation.

Under the guidance of the field worker, the screenings set in motion a kind of dialogue; as the islanders viewed themselves and each other, they became aware of certain problems, recognized mistakes, realized the lack of organization that hampered them, but also saw their own worth and accomplishments—in short, they viewed themselves objectively. Screenings were followed by discussion, and discussion by action.

Each of the island's ten communities saw enough films of other communities to become conscious of similarities in problems and goals; as a result, an island community began to emerge.

Outside the island, the films were shown to agencies, departments, government officials and individuals who could give the islanders the encouragement, advice and help they required in order to help themselves or the aid they had a right to expect.

The Fogo Island films were also shown to communities elsewhere in Newfoundland and Labrador and proved effective in initiating group meetings and problem-solving.

Research and evaluation

A community development project that truly puts the media at the service of the community is by its nature difficult to evaluate, since the community's wants and needs come to light as the project evolves. In fact, there is little evidence of any systematic research on or evaluation of this use of media.

Nevertheless, the purpose of user-oriented media is to bring about change, and change can be measured and, to some extent, evaluated. Also, as more and more projects of this nature are put into effect, some practical observations become evident.

Fogo Island has indeed changed since 1967. The island is now economically viable, with a producers' co-operative that has established a shipbuilding operation and undertaken other activities. Government welfare payments have been substantially reduced, and the island has received limited government assistance in the form of capital and improved transportation and educational facilities. A new central high school serving all communities and religions also offers community and adult functions. The improvement committee is active and the morale of residents is higher now that the fear of resettlement has gone.

There is, however, a possibility that the promotion of the Fogo process by those more interested in media experimentation than in community development may have resulted to some extent in the exploitation of the people of Fogo Island.

Further experience with the Fogo process and related projects involving user-oriented media seem to indicate some general guidelines:

It is impossible to predict what people given access to the media will do with it.

Most likely, they will criticize and challenge some forms of established authority. There is little sense in initiating a user-oriented communications project unless the social and political climate is such that media users will be listened to no matter how unexpected their communications.

The emphasis in such projects should be on user needs, not on hardware; the choice of media is a function of user needs.

The resident social worker or animator is even more important to a user-oriented project than media experts, a rapport with and understanding of the user group is more vital than technical expertise.

Case study 9

Communication and the functional education of women—GROW (Group Resources for Women)—Tobago, Caribbean

Location: Tobago, Trinidad and Tobago, West Indies.

Period of operation: Originally planned for January–December 1974, to be taken over by the national government during 1975; the project was later extended through 1975-76.

Source of information: Unesco files.

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

'GROW with Tobago' was conceived as a multi-media educational pilot project for women, in the context of International Women's Year, under Unesco's 'Application of the Communication Media to Lifelong Education' programme.

A small island (26 miles long and 7.5 miles wide), Tobago is governed from Port-of-Spain (Trinidad); a special Ministry of Tobago Affairs handles the island's administration. The 1970 Census showed a population of 40,790, more than half under 21. Over 5,000 girls were in school, but more than 3,500 under 19 were not. Average school-leaving age is 15. The schools provide little practical training. Work opportunities are limited; many Tobagonians emigrate to seek work. In 1970 only 1,600 women were employed. Social services (e.g. adult education courses, health clinics) are available but their activities are not always well co-ordinated. Except in the south-west, poor roads make communication difficult.

Some problems originally identified were:

Malnutrition, especially among young children; need for nutrition education. Underdeveloped agriculture and fishing. Only about 40 per cent of the island is cultivated; crop yields are poor; soil erosion is a problem. Once self-supporting, Tobago now imports food at high costs.

Lack of small business providing employment opportunities—e.g. dress manufacture, handicraft industry aimed at tourists, canning and preserving of local fruits.

Need for family planning.

Lack of local communications media.

Tobago seemed an ideal setting for a pilot project using communication techniques and communication media to inform and interest women in existing services, improve these services, and encourage community development.

Sponsorship

Government of Trinidad and Tobago and Unesco. The government was to provide office accommodation, a counterpart to work with the Unesco media specialist, facilities for radio production and air time, administrative assistance and supplies. Unesco was to provide a media specialist/project co-ordinator, technical consultants, evaluation expertise, equipment, funds for training. An associate media expert, not originally planned for, joined the project in 1975.

Clientele and agents

The project was supposed to reach all the 20,640 women of Tobago who needed it. However, project staff soon became convinced (at least implicitly) that the underlying problem was economic—lack of employment and learning opportunities—rather than simply a matter of education or attitudes (see 'Objectives' below). Thus, it explored development plans involving men (e.g. fishermen) as well as women. In fact, project staff had to remind themselves at times that the project was designed for women.

As for change agents, the project has used Tobagonians already engaged in adult education, social work, etc. During the first year a group of young people were trained in communication theory and practice and in still photography.

Scope

The project is small, but also non-selective, as it covers an entire geographical and administrative area—the island of Tobago. It was meant to be a pilot effort to serve as a model for larger efforts elsewhere.

Objectives

The over-all objective is

to use communication and communication techniques as a main generative force in community development, with particular application to functional education and the role of women in society.

Specifically, the project was intended to:

- Stimulate interest in women's social and economic development; help bring about necessary changes in attitude; provide a forum for discussion and debate.
- Encourage and spread awareness of community development schemes, including social and industrial projects, affecting women.
- Help co-ordinate work of all agencies—local, national, international—concerned with functional education for women.
- Develop information and promotional material supporting women's education; develop instructional and support materials, in co-operation with relevant educational agencies.

Provide for project evaluation, analysis of results, and detailed description of models possibly applicable elsewhere.

No particular theory or concept of communication in rural areas, or of the use of communication media to reach rural populations, was cited in stating original objectives. However, the objectives were implicitly based on the notion that media can be used to inform about, and awaken interest in, self-improvement and community development.

The Unesco Secretariat saw the project as a pilot exercise in the use of communication media to support existing functional education and economic development efforts. Unesco's position was that financing additional development projects was the responsibility of other organizations: the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Capital Development Fund, as well as bilateral aid programmes. Unesco and the Unesco National Commission for Trinidad and Tobago made several (unsuccessful) attempts to involve these other agencies in the programme.

Tobago, however, is a very poor, economically underdeveloped island, its personality and initiative much affected by the influence of its stronger, richer neighbour, Trinidad. Those concerned with the project locally became preoccupied with the lack of learning opportunities on the island. They spent the first year trying to identify possible projects and to awaken interest among government agencies and aid bodies in providing support. Clearly, the hope of developing new business and industry aroused more enthusiasm on the island than the prospect of using media to promote and improve already existing educational programmes.

Not surprisingly, the end of the first year of operations saw some friction between Unesco Headquarters and their field expert on the project's priorities and accomplishments. By December 1974 the project had produced few media materials except a cookbook promoting consumption of flying fish, in publication, and a photo record of project activities for Unesco, Paris. (In early 1975, project staff made some dozen videotapes in Trinidad on the marketing and design of handicrafts and other local products; these were shown to groups in Tobago to help improve their approach to work.) The delay was partly due to late equipment deliveries; however, there had been little planning as to how to use this equipment when it arrived.

Following the visit of a Unesco staff member from Paris, the project's programme for 1975 was redefined and made more specific. They were:

The production of weekly radio programmes to be transmitted over the national radio station.

The production of a simple weekly community newsletter, to be prepared and mimeographed by project personnel.

The continuation of experiments using video tapes for group work.

The mounting of several travelling seminars.

Of these activities, only the community newsletter developed into a permanent feature.

Project design

The following contributed actively to the original project design: a Unesco regional film and television adviser located in Trinidad (later the project's media specialist), the Secretary General of the Trinidad and Tobago National Commission for Unesco, and a consultant from the Australian Broadcasting Commission who visited Tobago from 16 May to 6 June 1973 to discuss the project with local authorities and prepare proposals. Their proposals were modified by communication specialists within the Unesco Secretariat, resulting in a 'Revised Project Document', dated 30 November 1973.

Some preliminary studies were carried out but are not well documented. Project working documents, however, make no mention of such data as the literacy rate on Tobago; the number, distribution and use of radio and television sets; the availability and distribution of reading materials and reading habits; the number and accessibility of adult education classes available to women, their educational content, attendance. Nor is there any indication of sociological information on such subjects as the reasons girls leave school or women's attitudes towards development, employment, adult education, vocational training, etc.

During the project's first year, a Trinidadian lecturer in management studies and a Tobagonian sociologist (the latter a woman), both from the University of the West Indies, designed a survey of the media available on Tobago: one week of monitoring radio and television, and one week of administering questionnaires. The survey was conducted by thirty volunteers, twenty of whom were teachers or clerks and the rest students, part-time workers, or unemployed young people. During the first week the volunteers were to monitor radio and television to note: (a) material of relevance to Tobago and Trinidad and the Caribbean; (b) material of relevance to women.

Since the volunteers were untrained and the available television set did not work, the results of the first week's monitoring were disappointing. During the second week the volunteers administered a questionnaire on listening and viewing habits to 350 women and 50 men in 15 districts of the island. One finding was that many Tobagonians listened very little to Radio 610 (see under 'The Media' below), preferring instead other West Indian stations. Another was that in some parts of the island it is very difficult to pick up any stations—an important finding for a project intending to make large use of local radio. A third finding was that, among women in isolated areas especially, there was great resistance to the idea of family planning.

In addition, a senior student of the University of the West Indies undertook a survey of the problems of small fishermen: lack of knowledge of the main fishing banks, inappropriate equipment, lack of a marketing infrastructure. Another student undertook a survey of village tourism possibilities.

None of these surveys used communication techniques other than one-to-one interviewing (e.g. community meetings, recorded on tape or videotape). None resulted in a formal report available at the Unesco Secretariat, although some findings were reported on in the Trinidad press.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

The project was the responsibility of Unesco and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, with the Trinidad and Tobago National Commission for Unesco acting as liaison; the Secretary General of the latter organization played an important role in supervising and directing the project. Locally, the project worked with a co-ordinating committee of adult educators and representatives of community action groups.

Originally, provision was made for relationships with ILO, FAO, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the Unesco Regional Communication Team, but during the first year of operations these bodies had little association with the project.

The media

Media available on Tobago when the project began included:

Two national newspapers published in Port-of-Spain (Trinidad), which carried little news of local interest to Tobagonians.

One government radio station (Radio 610), also located in Port-of-Spain.

Radio 610 maintained a small studio in Scarborough (capital of Tobago) but this was not staffed for local production.

One television station in Port-of-Spain.

The original project plan called for media to:

Provide information about community and educational activities.

Promote and maintain interest in such activities by providing a forum for discussion and information.

Develop specific materials for educational projects.

Provide a means of feedback from individuals and groups to local authorities and others interested. The intent was to involve the local population as fully as possible and make the most of existing services.

Thus, there was to be heavy emphasis on radio, simple print media (a local community newspaper), and slides, posters and simple audio-visual materials.

Subsequently, the project was to use a mobile vehicle equipped with videotape and photographic and slide projection facilities. Eventually television, too, was to be considered.

By the end of the first year, however, some of the early media expectations were just not being fulfilled. Lack of direction and limitations in skills soon exposed the limitations of video.

Attempts to bring radio into play proved abortive. The belated discovery of Radio 610's poor coverage led to ill-conceived plans for a local station being abandoned in the face of heavy capital costs.

In fact, it is the oldest mass medium which proved to be the most suitable to the needs and circumstances of Tobago. Largely through the initiative of the young associate expert, the *Tobago News* was launched and by the end of 1975 was showing both a wide community appeal and the possibility of sustained commercial viability.

Utilization (diffusion)

During the project's first year, it seems to have generated only general ideas about the use of media productions.

Research and evaluation

For research, see under 'Project Design', above.

The project was meant to have a strong evaluation component. (This was prejudiced from the start by the lack of basic data against which to measure results.) During October-November 1974 a Unesco consultant spent one month with the GROW project. His mission was to evaluate progress to date (in terms of community development and use of media), help redefine objectives, and identify equipment and training needs.

The consultant found in general that the project needed more time to develop real roots in Tobago. He endorsed the plans for a community newspaper and for a mobile community radio, and made recommendations on project organization and equipment purchase. However, his report cannot be considered a deep study of the project's problems and possibilities, or a document of use to others engaged in comparable projects.

The informal evaluation made by the Unesco staff member in April 1975 concluded that:

The project personnel are small in number, but enthusiastic, and their main problem seems to have been lack of direction and an inability to determine priorities or to plan ahead for their work. There seems to be more than a reasonable possibility that, once some refining of the programme has been completed, the project will move ahead and produce some concrete results.

Case study 10

The Philippine co-operatives development programme—the Philippines

Location: the Philippines.

Period of operation: five years—1973–78.

Source of Information:

BUREAU OF COOPERATIVES DEVELOPMENT. *Overview of the Philippine Cooperatives Development Programme*. Quezon City, n.d.

———. *Question and answer on the Samahang Nayan*. Quezon City, 1973.

DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. *Cooperatives strategy for rural development*. n.d. (Mimeo.)

Report on co-operatives for the president, no. 24. March 1975. (Mimeo).

SACAY, Orlando J., *Samahang Nasyon: a new concept in co-operative development*. Quezon City, National Publishing Cooperative Inc., 1974.

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago made up of over 7,000 islands off the south-east coast of Asia. Of a population of about 42 million, 70 per cent is rural. The nation's economy is largely based on exports of such basic agricultural products as sugar, copra and coconut oil.

The distribution of income in the Philippines is very unequal; 70 per cent of Philippine families earn less than 2,500 pesos a year,¹ while only 0.6 per cent earn over 20,000 pesos annually.

For two decades land reform has been viewed as the key to achieving a more equitable distribution of income. The first land reform act dates from 1955, followed by a second in 1963. These had little effect. In 1973 a new land reform programme was accompanied by a scheme for the formation of farmers' co-operatives and the institutions and services required to support them. This scheme was formalized by a decree on co-operatives approved by the President in April 1973.

Development of farmers' co-operatives was not a new idea. But in the past such organizations had been ineffective owing to, among other factors, inadequate and discontinuous efforts in co-operative education, and mismanagement or lack of qualified and adequately trained managers. Thus, the new scheme includes a widespread educational and promotional programme which has made important use of mass media.

Sponsorship

The Philippine Government, working through the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD), and specifically the newly formed Bureau of Cooperatives Development within this department, initiated and is responsible for the co-operatives programme. Under the administrative aegis of the DLGCD, the Bureau of Cooperatives Development directly handles the planning, organization and implementation of the co-operatives project, liaising closely with the Bureau of Local Government and the Bureau of Community Development for common tasks and infrastructure, especially in the field.

Funds for the programme, excluding salaries and allowances for DLGCD field-workers, were expected to amount to about 60 million pesos yearly. These come from government budgetary appropriations, foreign financial assistance (notably from the Canadian International Development Agency), and other sources; the programme has benefited from many donations in kind (e.g. radio time, paper for printing) from business enterprises and individuals. The Armed

1. 7.50 pesos = \$1 (conversion rate in mid-1975).

Forces donated time on their computer facilities. Of the budget for the first year 1973–74, 34 per cent was marked for research and evaluation.

Clientele and agents

The clientele are rural villagers—self-employed farmers, fishermen, plantation workers, either tenants or landowners—whose common bond is their *barrio* (or village) of residence.

On the regional, provincial and municipal levels, agents are field workers of the Department of Local Government and Community Development, most of whom are long-term civil service personnel familiar with rural development work. Training follows the ‘snowball’ principle: top technical staff of the DLGCD and selected experts designed a course for the regional directors, who then trained the approximately 65 provincial directors, who in turn trained approximately 1,400 municipal agents.

On the *barrio* level, some change agents are local DLGCD workers, but most are ‘volunteer *barrio* workers’, who are usually primary school teachers. (Almost every *barrio* in the Philippines has at least one teacher.) The *barrio* workers are trained by municipal DLGCD staff. They carry out the promotion and recruitment campaigns in their *barrios* and conduct the pre-membership education programme for prospective association members. Once formed, each *Samahang Nayon* (pre-co-operative) elects its own officials and board of directors, who serve without pay; members continue to promote the programme to non-members in the *barrio*.

Scope

The original plan called for involving 25,000 *barrios* nation-wide. All of these were to be reached by communication media.

At the end of the first year of operation (end of June 1974), 15,729 *barrios* had been covered and 10,419 *Samahang Nayon* organized with a total membership of 559,054 and total savings of 5,657,864 pesos. These results were the work of some 2,260 field workers and 8,778 volunteer *barrio* workers. According to a report to the President dated March 1975, by this date some 16,885 *Samahang Nayon* had been organized, with 743,426 members. Of these, 12,946 *Samahang Nayon*, with 612,258 members, had been registered. Total savings amounted to 28,633,000 pesos. In addition, eighty-eight *Kilusang Bayans* (full-fledged co-operatives) were organized, of which seventy-one were registered.

The co-operatives development programme is considered of major importance. In his preface to *Samahang Nayon: A New Concept in Co-operative Development*, President Marcos wrote:

It has become one of the most important programmes of the government at this time, perhaps one of the most crucial to the success of the wide-ranging body of reforms that aim at increased production.

The programme is not experimental. Pre-co-operatives that develop successfully merge to become full-fledged co-operatives, while those that fail to meet all requirements repeat the educational course (see ‘Project Design’ below).

Objectives

The primary objective of the co-operatives development programme is to help improve the quality of life for the Filipino farmer by training him to become a better producer, allowing him to pay off land amortizations, giving him a means of saving, encouraging him to perform economic activities such as buying supplies and selling produce collectively. The programme is also intended to develop marketing outlets for farm products.

Underlying these objectives is an even more basic aim: to change attitudes. Previous attempts at organizing co-operatives had largely failed because farmers waited passively for these organizations to provide them with funds; they did not see them as a tool which they themselves constructed and controlled.

The new co-operatives programme set out to show the farmer that the co-operative can be an instrument for self-sufficiency. Under this programme, farmers begin by forming a pre-co-operative or *barrio* association, called a *Samahang Nayon* (see 'Project Design' below). Only when they have come to understand and practise certain principles of co-operative action do they go on to form part of a full-fledged co-operative. During the pre-co-operative stage the farmer comes to see that—even if he farms only a small area—by grouping together with other small farmers, saving, and sharing resources he can take hold of his own destiny; in other words, he does not have to rely on the landlord or the government. Essentially, this change in attitudes amounts to a change in the farmer's view of social structure, and thus is potentially quite revolutionary.

Achieving these objectives—and especially changing attitudes—calls for serious promotional and educational efforts backed up by a widespread communication campaign. These make use of traditional Filipino ideals adapted to modern concepts. One of these is *Bayanihan*, meaning a sense of co-operative fellowship among people from the same village. Traditionally, *Bayanihan* applied only to services and goods; the challenge now was to get the farmer to extend it to sharing money and land. Another is *Baranggay*, originally meaning a large boat used by one clan (later, the Spanish word *barrio*, for village, came to replace it); it also has the connotation of organizing members of a group to work together. The name chosen for the *barrio* association, *Samahang Nayon*, connotes a village-moving-together. By using these traditional words in explaining new concepts, the promotional and educational campaign sought to root the co-operative idea in the Filipino value structure.

The use of communication in achieving these objectives was based on several principles:

In developing pre-co-operatives, and eventually co-operatives, education is a first necessity; the farmer must understand what he is doing and why he is doing it.

Education must be provided through interpersonal contacts.

The best change agent at the *barrio* level is someone from the village who can link traditional society to modern factors of change.

Rural mass media (radio, print) can alert, inform, interest and stimulate rural audiences and support the educational programme.

Media communications are especially effective if the farmer can identify with someone he recognizes (see 'The Media' below).

On the surface, everyone agreed with the co-operatives programme's objectives. However, there is potentially a certain amount of opposition to some of the roles co-operatives are eventually to play—for example, from rural bankers who do not welcome rivals to their business or who on principle think farmers are incapable of handling complex financial matters; and from marketing agents who see a possible threat to their income.

Project design

The co-operatives development programme has four stages. The first (lasting fifty-five weeks) calls for formally organizing and developing *Samahang Nayon* in the villages. This stage has two phases. Phase one, or the organizational phase, lasts ten weeks. During this period prospective members receive eight pre-membership lessons from field workers: on agrarian reform, the history and general principles of co-operatives, the *Samahang Nayon*. After this phase, an organizational meeting is held, officers are elected, and the *Samahang Nayon* applies for registration. To register it must have a minimum of twenty-five members (and not over 200), each of whom has paid a ten-pesos membership fee.

In the second phase of stage one, members learn how to manage and strengthen the *Samahang Nayon*. During this period, all members of the board of directors and officers of the *Samahang Nayon* take a twenty-week course on the responsibilities of officers, parliamentary procedures, group discussion techniques, how to conduct continuing member education and the campaign for expanding membership, how to keep accounts and prepare reports, etc. After the management training, two farmers are chosen for a two-week training in improved technology, after which they serve as agricultural counsellors and they deliver twenty technical lessons to be members of the *Samahang Nayon*. Following this cycle the *Samahang Nayon* chooses a secondary enterprise, or cottage industry, to specialise in and receives eight lessons on this enterprise. Finally, all members of the *Samahang Nayon* receive twelve of the lessons on management previously given to the board of directors and officers.

In the second stage, *Samahang Nayons* that have satisfactorily completed management training and technical education and put together the required savings (a minimum of 25,000 pesos) group together. When ten such associations join, they can become a fully fledged agricultural co-operative. These can serve as assembly, storage and processing points for all products delivered by member *barrio* associations. They can also serve as distribution agencies for manufactured goods and farm supplies.

In the third stage, consumers' co-operatives are organized in major urban areas to serve as outlets for agricultural products. In the fourth and last stage, the entire co-operative system is integrated into large co-operative enterprises.

Experts from various disciplines contributed to the programmes design. Foremost among these was Orlando J. Sacay, Under Secretary for Cooperatives Development, an economist with long experience in rural development and an acute awareness of the weaknesses of past efforts. Other consultants included an expert in rural communications from the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines, who helped design media strategy; an expert in communications and research who helped design the computerized programme and

feedback system; an economics and finance specialist; five veteran co-operatives organizers, and three experienced rural workers.

Phases one and two of the co-operative development programme were broken down into ninety-seven numbered activities—twenty-four in phase one and seventy-three in phase two—and each activity was described in detail in the manuals (see 'The Media' below). The entire programme was computerized; in this way field workers' reports can be fed into the computer and provide information on the programme's progress at any given moment.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

See 'Sponsorship' above.

Some organizational problems arose because the Bureau of Cooperatives Development was appended to the existing structures of the Department of Local Government and Community Development. Thus, though headed by an Under Secretary of Co-operatives, the bureau did not have its own field staff and it had to work through regional and provincial directors who were already working full time on local government and community development activities and sometimes found it difficult to assume responsibility for co-operative development in addition to their regular work.

Various other agencies contributed to the programme—for example, *Samahang Nayan* members were trained by technical agencies such as the Bureau of Agricultural Extension, the National Cottage Industry Development Authority, and the National Manpower and Youth Council.

The media

The communications media used to support the co-operatives development programme were radio and printed materials.

Radio communications included a jingle, spot announcements, slogans and discussion programmes. These were broadcast by both government-owned and private stations (250 stations in all), with the latter donating millions of pesos' worth of time free. The jingle used a melody based on an old folk song and was sung by the country's most popular singer, Nora Aunor, who donated her talents to the campaign. It was played once every fifteen minutes every day for about one month before the field workers entered the *barrios*, and after that twice an hour.

The thirty-three spots each lasted one minute. They presented a dialogue between a 'believer' and a 'sceptic', and disseminated selected bits of information about the *Samahang Nayan*. Broadcasts were scheduled to coincide with the educational campaign of the co-operatives development programme. Thirtythree slogans were also produced and broadcast at different intervals.

The forty-five discussion programmes, reviewing topics covered by the courses presented by field workers, each lasted one-half hour. They too were recorded in eight languages. Called the 'school-on-air', they were broadcast during phase two of stage one, between 7.30 and 8.00 p.m. on Saturday evenings, and were designed both to reinforce other media and to reach radio listeners who had missed earlier media and educational coverage. Members of

the *Samahang Nasyon* assembled to hear them together and to discuss the substance and other matters of interest after the broadcast.

Supplementary radio support came from occasional radio news items, interview programmes and press releases.

Print communications included ten four-colour leaflets – two were promotional and the other eight corresponded to the eight pre-membership lessons. A major brochure about the *Samahang Nasyon* was distributed at the end of the course. Prospective members were asked to pay a nominal fee for these materials. Seven posters for display in the *barrios* were also printed. Leaflets, brochure and posters were translated into the country's eight major dialects and used simple, but realistic sketches. Cartoon style, except for humour, was avoided lest the programme not be taken seriously.

In general, the strategies governing the media campaign were as follows:
Use economic motivational appeal by stressing the benefits offered by *Samahang Nasyon*.

Use positive social motivational appeal by associating membership with prestige, e.g. getting *barrio* leaders to support publicly the association, enhance social status of the members by making them more visible through public activities and mass media.

Use negative social motivational appeal by bringing social pressure or *hiya* to bear on any members and officers remiss in their responsibilities to the *Samahang Nasyon*.

Create a bandwagon effect, particularly during the preorganizational phase.
For the way in which the media were expected to serve the co-operative development programme, see the list of principles under 'Objectives' above.

Utilization (diffusion)

For results of a study of the effectiveness of the media, see 'Research and Evaluation', below.

In general, radio programmes were played widely and according to schedule. However, some personnel in local stations did not understand the letter of instructions and played some spots out of sequence; this happened easily because all the spots were recorded on one 45 r.p.m. record with a very narrow cueing distance between the bands.

Distribution of the printed media posed a serious problem. The study of extent of understanding (see 'Research and Evaluation', below) showed that on the average *Samahang Nasyon* members received two of the eleven leaflets, but 53 per cent did not receive any at all. This was not due to a shortage but to weaknesses in the distribution system.

Research and evaluation

See 'Project Design' above.

The co-operatives development programme incorporated a system of weekly field worker's reports, the data from which were computerized. The original computer report forms proved too complicated for field workers to fill in accurately and had to be simplified. Computer and other data served as the basis for the monthly report to the President.

A financial grant was made to the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Institute (ACCI) of the University of the Philippines to carry out a verification and evaluation study of the *Samahang Nayan* programme based on field workers' reports. The ACCI researchers interviewed 17,400 persons from 2,479 *barrios*, 30 per cent of whom were not members of *Samahang Nayan*, to determine the extent to which various aspects of the programme as taught by the educational and promotional campaign were understood.¹ As for the sources from which information came, the study showed that the field workers provided the major source for both groups. The stated impact of radio was much less than expected, even though 74 per cent of all respondents had radio sets. The impact of printed materials was even more disappointing. However, it is clear that the mass media significantly improved and reinforced the field workers' effectiveness.

1. Findings are given in *Samahang Nayan: A New concept in Co-operative Development*, p. 123 et seq.

Chapter 3

A critical analysis of the case studies

Although the case studies presented in the previous chapter constitute only a small sample of the various communication projects undertaken around the world in rural areas, they are fairly representative of past efforts to attack rural underdevelopment. In this chapter we analyse the key variables of these case studies, keeping in mind the historical development of theoretical knowledge about the role of communication in rural development presented in Chapter 1.

What ideas of rural development and the use of communication in fostering this development lay behind these ten programmes? Are these ideas clearly stated, or must they be inferred? Are there any discrepancies between expressed principles and goals and those actually in evidence? To what extent are these projects consistent with more recent concepts of communication and rural development? What lessons can we learn from an analysis of these projects for the improvement of present and future programmes?

Genesis; background; reasons for the project

All the projects described in the case studies arose, in theory at least, out of two convictions: the rural area chosen required some sort of development aid, and communication could help in bringing this aid.

However, to say this is only to begin to explain the reasons for establishing these and other rural development programmes using communication. There are many more questions to ask—for example:

Who first perceived the need for rural development? The local community itself, private groups, regional or national governments, bilateral or international aid agencies? Or several of these at once?

How did these instigators define rural development? Was it a matter of changing attitudes, increasing productivity, improving the quality of the individual's life (through education, better health, etc.), encouraging rural populations to remain on the land rather than flock to urban areas, giving

rural peoples the tools to develop their own political, social and cultural potential?

What role was assigned communication? Was it meant to convey information, or influence attitudes, or change behaviour? Or was it expected to allow rural populations to express their views, aspirations and demands?

As we shall see, all of these questions arise again and again under the variables discussed below. The answers given reflect an enormous variety of implied or conscious positions, philosophies, expectations and judgements. Where two or more groups were involved in a rural development programme using communication, they often had differing ideas on these questions, differences that sometimes were not evident at the genesis stage of a programme.

If we look at the origins of, and stated or implicit rationale for the ten case study programmes presented in Chapter 2, we find a great deal of variation. To take one extreme, Radio Sutatenza in Colombia, we see that a rural development programme using communication can start with the inspiration and drive of one man, a curate in a small village with access to a home-made radio transmitter and three radio receivers. An experience like this, if successful, can lead others to try to reproduce it—as did the diocese of Natal in Brazil, this time with a 250-watt transmitter and fifty receivers. In both cases the impetus for the programme was an acute awareness of underdevelopment, both economic and social.

Other programmes grew out of an agreement on the part of communication experts that certain communication techniques required testing under experimental conditions to learn more about how they worked in rural settings; the pilot radio rural forum project in India and the pilot adult education projects in Senegal fall into this category. (Both later served for expanded national programmes.)

Two of the case studies were conceived to further rural reform programmes receiving high national priority: agrarian reform in Peru, and the development of co-operatives in the Philippines. Two other case studies aimed at using communication to reinforce specific programmes to improve rural life: in Iran, this involved promoting a family-planning campaign, while in the United Republic of Tanzania radio and printed media served three distinct campaigns: two dealing with increasing political awareness, and the third with improving health and hygiene practices. This leaves two final case study programmes with rather special origins: the GROW project in Tobago, where the aim was to improve the lot of women through multi-media education (this programme was influenced by the designation of 1975 as International Women's Year), and the Fogo Island programme, where the intent was to apply a new audio-visual technique in helping a region with special problems and undergoing social change.

What comments can we make about the genesis of these programmes?

In none of the ten case studies did the request for a rural development programme using communication originate with the people most concerned—the rural populations themselves. (We should, however, point out that Colombia's Radio Sutatenza and Brazil's MEB originated with people working closely with their clientele.) One more usual pattern seems to be for a government to decide on a development scheme (agrarian reform, family planning) and then search out a locale and a team to carry out a communication programme to promote the scheme. Another is for an international agency or group to become interested in a communication technique (radio farm forums) or a development

problem currently arousing interest (promotion of women) and then find a country willing to embark on a programme centred around this technique or problem.

The rather haphazard origins of these programmes suggest the need for countries and bilateral and international organizations to take a closer look at over-all priorities in rural development and at communication resources so as to determine where rural development communication efforts are most needed and will have the greatest effect.

Sponsorship

By their very nature, rural development programmes involving communication usually have more than one sponsor; sometimes they have several, each with a varying degree of authority over the programme's design and evolution. One sponsor may be concerned with economic development, a second with raising educational, health or nutritional levels, a third with increasing civic or political consciousness, a fourth with the technical aspects of using communication techniques—and still another may be looking at the programme only as an experiment that will provide statistical data for analysis.

The ten cases presented in Chapter 2 illustrate this diversity. Only one—Radio Sutatenza—is entirely self-supporting and is run from one central authority. Most of the others involve government support in one form or another. A common pattern is for international agencies to provide aid in the experimental or pilot stage of the programme, leaving later expansion to the government. (This arrangement can pose problems, some of which are discussed under 'Scope' below). Interestingly, the two cases consisting of short-term campaigns (Iran and the United Republic of Tanzania) involved the greatest number of sponsors or collaborators. In the United Republic of Tanzania these were all local organizations, and perhaps this fact explains the planned and rational use of accumulated experience and knowledge from campaign to campaign.

Although programme objectives are discussed below, a great deal about them and about the evolution of the programme can be inferred from the nature of the programme's sponsor or sponsors. What does the sponsor expect to happen as a consequence of the programme? Does it want to perpetuate the *status quo*, or does it mean to induce dramatic changes in the social structure?

If the sponsor is a government, its form will surely affect the conception of a rural development programme. A country with a pluralistic system and a democratically elected government will have a different approach, and different possibilities of support, organization, mobilization, etc., than a one-party or totalitarian State. But in considering this influence, it is easy to fall into stereotypes. Why, for instance, should the military government in Peru promote the people's participation in development, when it has been traditional for military governments to support a semi-feudal land tenure system? The answer may be that the present government of Peru wants to achieve a sense of national unity, and encourage the entire population to identify with the nation. This may best be achieved by breaking down rigid class stratification systems and educating the masses on their own stake in nation building through such programmes as PEIFEDER.

If the sponsor is a private organization, we might well ask what are its social role and its ties with the rural community? Why should it be interested in development of the rural masses? What does development mean to it? How does its conception of rural development fit with the aspirations and motivations of the rural population concerned?

If a separate agency is to provide the communication component of a rural development programme, we should know how qualified it is to do so. For example, in some of the case studies presented here advertising agencies were consulted or used. Was this a wise choice? Are more communication agencies more interested in testing and promoting new 'hardware' than in analysing the realistic needs of rural populations?

Bilateral and international organizations that sponsor rural development programmes can also be analysed in this fashion. What is their institutional nature? What sorts of possibilities and constraints shape their contribution to rural development, whether it be intellectual, philosophical, technical or simply financial? What do they expect to happen as the result of a given rural development programme?

Project sponsors themselves—whether private or governmental, local, regional, national or international—should undertake this analysis of their nature, philosophy and objectives, as these will determine many crucial decisions in the process of planning any rural development programme. In looking at some of the case studies, one is tempted to conclude that their sponsors did not devote enough time to specifying clearly what they really wanted and why.

It is quite possible—in fact, it happens rather often—that the various agencies collaborating in a given programme do not share the same basic concept of the nature and purpose of rural development and of rural communication. The kind of analysis suggested here—combined, if possible, with a clear statement of purpose—would be most helpful in preventing or attenuating divergences in opinion and expectation between sponsors. For example, the various Agencies of the United Nations pronounce themselves officially on matters concerning rural development—on, say, agrarian reform. Yet it is often overlooked that these Agencies are in fact comprised of member states. On the one hand, this means that the member states with the greatest influence can often impose their views in defining not only the Agency's official stand but also its possibilities for action. On the other hand, it means that when these Agencies lend technical support to a member state they must comply with that State's approaches and priorities.

Clientele and agents

To say that the clientele of rural development programmes consist of rural population leaves the impression that such programmes reach everyone falling into this category. To what extent is this true?

Of the ten case studies in Chapter 2, only one programme, Fogo Island, attempted to involve a rural population in its entirety. The others were aimed at groups of varying inclusiveness: Radio Sutatenza of Colombia at rural *campesinos* wanting education, the MEB of Brazil at 'peasants', the Tanzanian radio campaigns at rural adults, the Philippine co-operatives development campaign at farmers susceptible of forming co-operatives, the Indian radio rural forums at

farmers, the two pilot projects in Senegal at urban women and village men, and the GROW programme in Tobago at women (though it ended up involving men as well). All these programmes were meant for rural people willing and able to join groups for learning, radio listening and/or discussion. The PEIFEDER programme of Peru had the largest stated group of clients: children, youth and adults.

Who, then, is left out? From many of the programmes, women are excluded—either intentionally or because in certain societies development programmes will not reach women unless a very special effort is made. Out-of-school youth are also often forgotten. The unproductive elderly are never mentioned. And how about those too isolated geographically or too socially excluded to join discussion groups—for example, how about nomads? Do any rural education programmes try to establish a dialogue, with those who might in theory oppose progressive change, for example the large land-owners?

In short, usually when we talk about development programmes using communication for rural populations we are concerning ourselves with a relatively privileged section of these populations.

Another observation about clientele, which we will discuss more under 'Objectives': most programmes tend to aim at short-term, easily observable changes in behaviour—adoption of family planning, learning to read, accepting a new agricultural practice. Few programmes take a long-range view of the profound and cumulative changes rural people may need to experience if real development is to occur. Although Radio Sutatenza in Colombia provided a progression of educational programmes and MEB in Brazil foresaw the organization of peasants into active political groups, none of the ten projects considered using communication as a tool of continuing education.

As for change agents, in almost every case study these appear as a crucial factor in the programme's success or failure.

The ten programmes used a wide variety of kinds and numbers of change agents: while Brazil's MEB at its peak employed 400 salaried full-time workers in the field and at the national office, most programmes made do with a very small full-time staff, and depended on the part-time services of professionals working for other agencies or the volunteer services of para-professionals or amateurs in the field.

In considering change agents, several major problems become apparent.

Number

Change agents are usually in short supply; practically every programme described in Chapter 2 could have used more agents in the field. At one time communication media were seen as a means of replacing field personnel. But it is now established that communication through the media is more effective when coupled with interpersonal contact (in fact, some projects like MEB considered mass media only as support for interpersonal communication). Thus, we can no longer use the wider reach of mass media as an excuse for assigning fewer field personnel to rural development programmes.

Choice

Who makes a good change agent? This depends of course on the nature of the development programme. Many rural programmes use personnel already in the

field working for various development agencies: education, health, agricultural extension, etc. Often they are asked to take on supplementary tasks in support of a particular programme in addition to an already heavy workload. This is the case in the Philippine co-operatives development programme, for example, where local development personnel were sometimes none too enthusiastic about adding a new educational activity to an already full schedule. School-teachers are a frequent choice, and yet many experts question whether the local primary school teacher, accustomed as he or she is to dealing with children all day as a figure of authority, is the logical person to ask to work with adults as an equal.

As pointed out in Chapter 1, much has been made of the idea of using local 'opinion leaders' to promote rural development through communication. However, this approach is subject to criticism if one of the purposes of the development programme is to encourage a questioning attitude towards the *status quo*, of which the 'opinion leader' is obviously an element. Also, those who appear to be 'opinion leaders' to an outsider visiting a rural community may not be persons in whom the local people recognize leadership qualities; sometimes it takes long study or a deep knowledge of the community to know who the true natural leaders (perhaps 'animators' is the better term) are. Few programmes seem to have made a special effort to develop these natural leaders. The MEB in Brazil may have been an exception in the attention it gave to developing animators.

Training

Training of programme staff, from those at headquarters to those at village level, presents one of the most persistent problems in rural development. Practical problems—how to group people for training, who should train them, with whom they can keep contact after the training session—receive the most attention. However, the quality of training offered is actually of much more consequence in determining the programme's effects.

Too often change agents are trained quickly and superficially, as if mobilizing and educating people for rural development and making good use of communication in this process were as simple a matter as showing people how to build a latrine or fertilize soil. In most cases, these change agents are taught a pedagogy of transmission and persuasion, rather than shown how to help people learn to reason, ask questions, make decisions.

This latter kind of pedagogy requires the use of different conceptual instruments and different methods. Even more important, it requires that the change agent himself be educated by his own trainers in the same way that he will be expected to educate rural people.

Scope

Some of the programmes described in Chapter 2 were designed as pilot projects, others began as pilot efforts and were expanded once the pilot stage was finished. The only programmes aimed at the entire nation on a large scale are the Tanzanian radio campaigns and the Philippine co-operatives development programme.

A pilot project can sometimes be very useful as a first step. This seems to have been the case in the United Republic of Tanzania, where the first two radio study campaigns, though nation-wide in scope, were essentially pilot projects, and experience with them contributed greatly to the success of the third campaign, which involved about 2 million adults. In Senegal, too, the pilot project establishing Radio Educative Rurale seems to have provided a good basis for expanding the programme nation-wide.

In India, however, the pilot project in radio farm forums was more successful than the expanded effort that followed. Wilbur Schramm judged that this was because running a pilot project and running a nation-wide development programme are two very different activities, and in this case the conditions required for a successful expanded programme were not met (see page 31).

How useful, then, are pilot projects in rural development communication? Very popular in the past decade, these efforts are now coming in for a fair amount of criticism:

A pilot project in itself cannot usually deal adequately with problems of rural development. Such problems usually require measures that transcend the range of influence of a short-term effort: for example, new legislation, institutional reorganization, the construction of an infrastructure, serious socio-economic change, and so on.

In addition, since pilot projects have short time horizons, they aim at quick results: this approach is incompatible with the slower, deeper reaching processes necessary for true change.

In theory, of course, those who design the pilot project are supposed to provide for extrapolating the methodology used to a larger effort. However, this is rarely the case. More often, the project becomes an end in itself and few people taking part in it worry about the larger projection of its operations. This is especially true when foreign experts are brought in to direct the project. Personnel who acquire experience in a given pilot project are seldom retained for subsequent expansion programmes. Unfortunately, even the national counterparts they train sometimes decide to leave their own countries to set up projects elsewhere.

Pilot projects are often necessary at the outset of a development communication effort. However, they should be seen not as an end in themselves, but as a first step in a long-term effort to introduce innovative strategies and structures for the use of communication into already existing national institutions in charge of rural development.

Objectives

Objectives are really the heart of a rural development communication programme. They determine such other elements of the programme as the clientele, the content, the institutional context, the media, the methods, and so on. But above all they are important because they indicate a definition of the problems and needs of the rural population in question, and what solution to these problems and needs is proposed.

Therefore, in looking at objectives we should ask such questions as:

What development problems are the proposed objectives designed to attack?

What criteria were used to select the objectives; why these problems and not others?

Are the objectives precise, clearly stated, realizable?

What persons and groups participated in establishing objectives? Do they all share the same goals? To what degree are they committed to the implementation of these goals?

Often the objectives of development communication programmes refer to two sets of goals: one having to do with the effect on the programme's specific clientele, and the other with the effect on an aspect or aspects of the development of the society as a whole.

Colombia's ACPO had objectives that range from 'human promotion: creation of the whole man' to 'integration of the *campesino* into society . . . organization and development of the community . . . greater productivity . . .', etc. Peru's PEIFEDER aimed at 'promoting the active participation of the local population in their integral development' as well as 'improving the existing educational systems and services'. The Philippine co-operatives development programme had as its stated primary objective 'to help improve the quality of life for the Filipino farmer' through various means; however, the main emphasis of the programme was to set up a system of farmers' co-operatives eventually leading to a national co-operative system.

Some programmes had very precise objectives—for example, increasing acceptance of the practice of family planning in Iran, and studying the possibilities of using radio rural forums in India. Others were open-ended; that is, they aimed at beginning a process of education and self-discovery that, by its very nature, could not be defined in terms of a specific result or results. Brazil's MEB, with its emphasis on conscientization and the United Republic of Tanzania's first two radio campaigns, with their stress on encouraging discussion and exploration of the political process, are examples.

Not infrequently, programmes began with or developed vague or over-ambitious objectives. In Peru's PEIFEDER it took a visit by Unesco communication experts to trim down the original inflated goals to clearer, more feasible objectives. In Tobago as well the original objectives were diffuse: while Unesco saw the programme as a pilot exercise in using communication media to support existing educational and economic development activities affecting women, the field personnel got caught up in designing various economic development proposals, not all of them relating to women. Again a Unesco team had to visit the project to formulate more precise objectives linked to the original goals.

On the other hand, sometimes a programme with rather commonplace objectives can develop activities that unexpectedly result in a new technique or direction. This happened in Senegal, where a somewhat routine (though, as pointed out above, open-ended) intent to 'use modern techniques for the purpose of adult education' evolved into the Radio Educative Rurale, which had a decisive effect on the relations between peasant farmers and the central government. Another example is the Fogo Island programme, where the first objective was to make films around the issue of resettlement, but the end result was development of a new communication technique of great potential for community development.

The trend in development communication now is definitely towards the use of communication as a tool for building community self-awareness and deter-

mining what action the community itself wants to take. In projects making this use of communication it is difficult to state exactly when precise objectives need to be formulated. If the project sponsor or sponsors begin a project with a set of specific, precisely stated objectives, communication will not serve the community in making its own decisions about objectives, it will only provide a means of dissemination and discussion. On the other hand, the sponsorship and administrative requirements of most projects call for some sort of statement of objectives at the outset. Ideally, such a statement would stress the need for defined objectives, but make clear that this definition must be the responsibility of those concerned by the project and that communication will be used as a tool in this process.

Sometimes it is crucial to distinguish between the stated objectives of a programme and the real objectives, those that command the actual behaviour of its change agents and clientele. These are often quite different. A good example of the divergence between theoretical and actual objectives can be found in many agricultural extension services around the world. While most of these services define their goal as 'the non-formal education of the farmers and their families', the operational objective of many is to increase the adoption of new agricultural technology by the small number of farmers capable of responding to economic incentives.

An important factor often presenting a dilemma for a development communication programme is the compatibility of its objectives with the major priorities of the government. The degree of this compatibility may mean the difference between survival or extinction, particularly when the objectives deal with social change. Therefore, an important question to ask in relation to objectives is whether the programme is an organic part of the national development plan or a fragmented, isolated, self-contained effort. While almost any education programme may be of national interest, development communication programmes should respond to the priorities established by the nation if they are to have the political support essential for their success.

Since the majority of the programmes reviewed were sponsored by governments or by organizations closely connected with them, they cannot be accused of operating in isolation. However, some were more directly in line with the current emphasis of national policy than others. For example, the Philippine co-operatives development programme gave important support to a policy of agrarian reform, while the United Republic of Tanzania's programme of civic education through radio study groups closely fitted the country's efforts to replace colonial values and traditions with modern political participation. Timing too is important: while the PEIFEDER programme in Peru was designed to coincide with agrarian reform, the programme began activities before reform measures had been taken in the area of operation.

As development communication increasingly stresses the use of communication as a tool for community decision-making and action, there are apt to be more conflicts between project objectives and perceived national priorities. It is to be hoped that communication itself will play an important role in revealing the positions of various groups to other groups, in promoting and allowing exchanges of ideas and discussion, and thus in resolving differences of viewpoint.

Finally we should note that some case studies present a certain confusion between objectives and means and methods. For example, among objectives for

the GROW programme in Tobago we find 'production of weekly radio programmes . . .' and 'production of a simple weekly community newsletter . ..'. If these are objectives, evaluation of the programme could show 100 per cent success as long as all planned radio programmes and newsletters were actually produced. However, this evaluation would say nothing of changes produced in the programme's clientele through use of these methods.

Project design

Here we ask ourselves such questions as: Who designed the programme? Were theoreticians consulted? If so, from what disciplines? And at what point in the programme's design? How much did they contribute? How much did the programme rely on previous experience and on the results of previous research?

In most of the case studies, social scientists and other experts were consulted at one stage or another. In some, a whole battery of experts participated in planning operations—examples would be the MEB in Brazil, which brought together a full-time staff of philosophers, sociologists, pedagogues, economists and anthropologists at its national office; the Philippine co-operatives development programme, which was based on a good deal of economic analysis and for which a computerized timetable for operations was established and used; and the Esfahan projects in Iran, where a number of experts collaborated on such activities as carrying out surveys, preparing and pre-testing media materials, and devising a work schedule listing project objectives for each month of operations.

In other projects, experts were called in for help after operations had begun. A study of the PEIFEDER project in Peru during the first phase of operations showed that the project area's problems were much more serious than originally foreseen and revealed a lack of crucial facilities and infrastructures. As a result of this study and a review conducted by a Unesco team, the range and objectives of the project were greatly modified.

Similarly, the project in Tobago began with an absence of basic sociological and economic data. When a survey was finally made, it revealed, among other things, that many of the target audience did not listen to the radio station planned to carry the main burden of project communication, and that in fact some parts of the island could not receive radio broadcasts at all.

A third, less spectacular but quite effective use of expert advice was made by the Senegalese pilot projects. These projects were designed to test various ideas that had been receiving attention at an international level about the use of mass media in adult education and rural development. However, the projects were firmly rooted in the Senegalese environment. While they suffered from various practical problems—for example, lack of equipment and staff—a great deal of credit for their positive achievements is attributed to the fact that a Senegalese sociologist assigned to the projects worked with them continually, providing constant practical advice and keeping in close touch with discussion groups and with animators.

Finally, the Fogo Island programme presents in this, as in many other respects, a special case. According to the documentation, 'it seems to have been designed on the spot, through a flexible exchange among the island residents,

the field workers, and the film producer'. This programme, and Brazil's MEB to some extent, seem the only two in which rural participants actually had a hand in project design.

In general, we can say that these programmes, like most programmes using communication for rural development, were mainly designed and directed by media practitioners working with personnel experienced in various aspects of rural development. Quite naturally, these practitioners were more concerned with the choice of communication media and the way in which they were to be used than with the deeper questions of why and to what end the programme was being implemented.

When other scientists and experts—sociologists, anthropologists, pedagogues, etc.—were consulted in designing such programmes, they were usually asked to provide tools to achieve an already determined result (improving nutrition, raising the literacy rate, increasing acceptance of family planning, changing attitudes, etc.). Rarely were these 'outside' consultants encouraged to make a probing analysis of the reasons underlying the specific problem being attacked: poor nutrition, illiteracy, a high birth rate, apathy towards modernization. Even more rarely were they asked to evaluate the approaches proposed to 'solving' the problem. If they were eventually called in when it was apparent that a programme was in difficulty (as in Peru's PEIFEDER), their findings were sometimes so devastating as to put the entire programme in question.

Thus, it would seem that the communication expert in charge of designing a rural development programme involving communication is willing to take practical advice from theoreticians and experts from other disciplines, but he does not often solicit critical examination of basic questions. And in fact he often has a legitimate reason to beware of doing so. That reason is the theoretician's tendency to isolate theory from practice.

The truth is that practitioners and technicians conversant with 'hardware' are often ahead of theoreticians, experts, and researchers—and they themselves are aware of this fact. Practitioners are constantly learning from experience and direct contact with rural populations, while many scholars content themselves with analysing results from a distance. In the field of communication, technology and strategy are more likely to emerge from practice than from theory. Not infrequently, advances in technology force the launching of new strategies, and the theoreticians arrive on the scene later to 'explain' what has happened.

Nevertheless, the theoretician and the expert from other disciplines besides communication have much to offer the communication practitioner responsible for a rural development programme. This is especially true if the communication practitioner has the foresight to call upon these consultants to provide a larger perspective for the programme from the beginning—to analyse, for example, the real causes of rural underdevelopment and to suggest what goals the programme at hand can logically set for itself.

A frequent omission in project design is an explicit definition of the pedagogical thinking behind the planners' choice of educational activities. For such a definition to be formed, planners must have some awareness of various theories of communication and learning (these are summarized in Chapter 1). Even planners who sincerely intend to use democratic methods and to serve rural populations as fully as possible may be completely unaware that the approaches they endorse are based on inappropriate concepts—for example, that of communication as instruction and persuasion through a one-way transmission from

sender to receiver. Once they are introduced to some of the newer ideas about, say, the relationship between rural development and social change, the two-way nature of communication, the importance of participation and feedback, they may be able to make radical improvements in the design of rural communication development programmes.

Organization, or 'institutional context'

For a rural development programme using communication to operate, certain organizational problems must be solved. Among these are: (a) obtaining funding; (b) assigning responsibility for planning and action; choosing staff and any consultants; determining their reporting arrangements; (c) scheduling activities; (d) producing communication materials; co-operating with media agencies transmitting them; (e) arranging for field activities; (f) training field personnel; (g) providing for feedback and incorporation of data received; (h) providing for research and evaluation.

It is possible for all these activities to fall under one agency and authority, as in the case of Colombia's ACPO. However, the very nature of rural development (the involvement of various agencies dealing with different aspects of a complex problem; the need for special competencies such as communication technology or pedagogical expertise; the political implications of any effort of economic and social development of groups of citizens; the lack of resources which requires soliciting funds from various sources, etc.) usually means that several agencies or organizations become involved in running any rural development programme using communication.

When this is the case, the problem of organizing activities so as to allow smooth co-ordination and diminish possibilities for friction or duplication of effort is one of the most difficult to deal with; this is well illustrated in several of the case studies. Already established agencies tend to resent the intrusion of a separate entity with a mandate to engage in some of the activities for which they have previously had sole responsibility. Conversely, the special programme, if set up outside and parallel to these agencies, is frustrated when it cannot gain the co-operation it needs from them.

Several of the programmes described in the case studies attempted to solve organizational problems by establishing co-ordinating bodies (called 'committees', 'boards', etc.) which grouped representatives of the various agencies and services concerned with the programme. This approach seemed to help in the case of short-term special campaigns, like those carried out in the United Republic of Tanzania, and pilot projects—that is, in situations where these representatives can elicit special co-operation for a particular programme with well-defined goals. However, for more sustained programmes the co-ordinating body approach was not always sufficient. Sometimes lack of co-operation can become so acute that only a radical step will suffice to free a programme from paralysis—such as the President of Senegal's having to establish a new Ministry of Rural Development and an interministerial committee for educational radio by Presidential Decree in order to ensure the survival of Radio Educative Rurale.

Nevertheless, it should be possible to reduce organizational difficulties by carefully thinking out a programme before it begins in some of the ways already pointed out earlier in this chapter. For example:

By ensuring that the various sponsors of a programme are quite lucid about why they are sponsoring it, and that their motives are also clear to other agencies concerned.

By giving adequate thought to the objectives of a programme to ensure that they are feasible, and to the resources required to meet these objectives to ensure that they can be made available without straining existing programmes and agencies. (We have already mentioned that a frequent source of irritation is the fact that field personnel with a full workload are often asked to take on even more responsibility when a new programme is launched.)

By launching fewer programmes solely as pilot projects, which often benefit from an unnatural wealth of means and attention and have a short life, and by integrating more programmes into existing institutions even though this process takes longer.

By viewing rural development programmes using communication in terms of national development priorities and thus enlisting more general agreement and enthusiasm about their goals.

One observation made clear by the ten case studies presented in Chapter 2 is that support for a rural communication development effort at a high level can go a long way towards ensuring its success. The role played by the President of Senegal referred to above, the support given by the President and the Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania to the 1973 radio education campaign, and the ardent interest shown by the President of the Philippines in the co-operatives development programme have been important factors in the success of these programmes. Obviously—though we will not dwell on it—the opposite is also true: indifference in high places makes it almost impossible to create enthusiasm at the local level and can even kill a programme's chances of survival.

Media

Most of the programmes described in Chapter 2 were experimental in their use of communication media for rural development, and thus were designed to test systems, procedures, equipment, materials. (ACPO in Colombia, with its long-established and firmly entrenched educational programme, was one exception, since it had long since passed the experimental stage.)

What lessons can we learn from these experiences? Here are some observations presented more or less at random:

First, in many cases, there is a large discrepancy between the problem at hand and the communication intervention designed to solve it. In Iran, for example, a short-term programme plus a relatively small staff of health corps women, under the over-all direction of a single professional staff manager and a secretary, were expected to persuade large numbers of women of child-bearing age to accept and practice family planning—that is, to overcome traditions,

taboos, fears, and ignorance. Not surprisingly, the case study states: 'Continued practice will require more widely spread contraceptive sources, especially in rural areas; effective distribution of contraceptive devices; and continuing information and persuasion.'

Where communication is assigned a specific and feasible task, it can be very effective: for example, in the radio campaigns in the United Republic of Tanzania. But communication alone cannot change the basic causes of rural underdevelopment. A communication programme, no matter how brilliant, in an area where no other attacks on underdevelopment are in evidence is bound to be a waste of time. In fact, arousing expectations through the media that cannot be met by existing services can have disastrous effects.

Second, some rural development programmes using communication are initiated before enough knowledge has been gathered about the context in which the media are to operate. Sometimes, as in the Tobago case study, even the most elementary data about adult literacy and radio reception are unavailable: when they are later uncovered they can make it necessary completely to revise original objectives and strategies.

Third, not all rural development programmes have used the communication component to the best advantage. Too often communication is still viewed as it was decades ago, as a one-way process of transmission of information or persuasion. Although the programmes in Iran and the Philippines made use of highly sophisticated communication techniques—a multi-media approach, pre-testing of materials, careful scheduling, etc.—the basic concept behind these activities was to promote a specific action (the programme in the Philippines did, however, put much stress on education). It is not surprising that both programmes relied on advertising agencies as consultants.

Fourth, analysis of the use of media in almost all the programmes illustrates the importance of interpersonal contact, already discussed under change agents above. In most, change agents were trained to supplement the effect of communication messages by leading discussions, providing further explanations, and channelling feedback. In Brazil's MEB, however, a reverse optic was adopted: radio and printed matter were themselves considered supplements to the prime form of communication: interpersonal dialogue.

Fifth, the choice of communication media, and thus of the 'hardware' required to use it, presents some dilemmas. At least three case study programmes—in Senegal, Peru and Tobago, and all receiving support from Unesco—suffered from delays in the arrival of important equipment considered necessary for project implementation. Perhaps this is a warning that before deciding to import a mass of expensive and sophisticated equipment, project designers should study the communication media already available in the country, introducing new technology only when absolutely necessary for attainment of particular educational goals. When equipment must be imported, time should be allowed for purchase, transport, installation and training of local personnel—delays in all these operations are foreseeable and can be scheduled. Whenever possible low-cost technology such as radio, audio cassettes, puppets, and rural newspapers should be preferred to impressive but impractical and expensive hardware.

Sixth, communication must be based on local culture if it is to have any meaning. The Philippine co-operatives development programme produced materials in eight dialects, while the Senegal projects used materials in Wolof

and addressed themselves only to people speaking this language. To keep in touch with local needs it is often advisable to allow for decentralized message and materials production. While maintaining a central office to co-ordinate all the regional subprojects, ACPO in Colombia and MEB in Brazil established a number of regional subcentres from which programmes were broadcast and materials distributed.

Finally, none of the programmes actually put communication tools into the hands of rural populations (unless we consider the letters sent by Indian and Senegalese farmers back to broadcasters as a form of communication). The Fogo Island programme came the closest to this approach: here a professional crew of film-makers made twenty-six films that attempted to give a comprehensive picture of the island as the islanders themselves saw it. The professional team worked closely with a local extension service field worker who knew and was trusted by island residents. Final editing power lay with the people shown in the film; it was they who decided if the films did or did not represent their lives. (As indicated under utilization, the really innovative aspect of this programme came from using the films to provoke discussion.) In Senegal, the women audiences for closed-circuit television contributed to choosing and providing material for programming. But in these case studies at least, no rural people actually handled film or recording equipment. (In Tobago plans were made for islanders to produce their own newspaper, but initially at least this did not happen.) There is little doubt that such activity is going to increase in the near future. In fact, later experiments in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere based on the Fogo Island process have involved turning the media over to rural groups.

Utilization (diffusion)

Communication programmes incorporate various strategies of production, diffusion and utilization of messages. In analysing the programmes described in Chapter 2, we can identify three main strategies:

One emphasizes deploying several communication media, both personal and impersonal, for increasing the flow of communication among rural people, and between these people and the government agencies who serve them; the purpose is to promote a joint intensive attack on commonly perceived problems of rural development. We shall call this rural communication.

Another strategy emphasizes using communication to facilitate changes in knowledge, attitudes, values, habits and skills in the rural population, so as to prepare these people to perform more adequately their personal and social roles and thus foster their own development and that of the nation in general. We shall call this strategy rural education.

The third combines the goals of the first two: increased communication flow and improved performance of roles and functions. We shall call this rural communication-education.

In developing countries, it seems evident, all programmes should be of the third type. It is difficult to see how any programme in rural development using communication can be useful if it does not involve close collaboration between communication specialists and education specialists. Communication specialists

can help educators achieve their goals; conversely, certain changes in knowledge, attitude and practices may be instrumental for increasing communication flow for problem solution.

The projects described in Chapter 2 exhibit various patterns of message diffusion and utilization. Below we analyse these patterns. The reader is invited to consider which correspond most closely to the rural communication-education strategy.

Open broadcast

From a central source, messages are transmitted to individuals; no provision is made for interaction among receivers. Most commercially operated radio and television stations follow this pattern. Although listeners are sometimes encouraged to phone in their opinions and requests, the only formal feedback mechanism is the audience survey. This diffusion pattern also occurs with the use of posters displayed in public places, billboards and books sold commercially. An example would be the mass media campaign on family planning in Iran.

Two-steps downward

Messages are delivered to privileged receivers ('gatekeepers' or 'opinion leaders') who pass them on to 'followers' in two- or multiple-step flows. The rural extension agencies using local opinion leaders, either voluntary or paid, to spread new practices among the farmers apply this pattern. So do radio school systems using monitors who interpret messages to students. An example would be the learning programme of Radio Sutatenza in Colombia.

Selective individual delivery

Messages are delivered individually to selected persons at their place of work or residence. Home visits, direct mail, circular letters, telephone calls, correspondence courses, etc., fall into this pattern. The 'intensive' family planning experiment in Iran combined this approach with the use of other media (radio, posters, letters).

Vertical group delivery downward, no feedback

People are gathered in a common place to receive messages; interaction is not explicitly encouraged. This pattern is applied in technical talks; political speeches; use of loudspeakers; projection of films, film-strips and slides; displays and exhibits. It differs from open broadcast only in that people are gathered together to receive messages and may informally discuss them afterwards.

Vertical group delivery downward, with localized interaction

People are gathered together to receive messages; reaction, discussion and decision-making are encouraged. This pattern characterizes discussion meetings, radio rural forums, radio animation projects, demonstrations, television viewing groups which engage in discussion, and so on. Examples would be the groups described above in India, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Philippines, and in MEB in Brazil.

Horizontal communication/dialogue

Messages are not delivered to people. They themselves generate the messages and exchange and discuss them among themselves. Among the programmes discussed here, the Fogo Island one comes the closest to fitting this pattern.

Two-way vertical communication/dialogue

This pattern involves personal encounters, as when a minister of agriculture or education visits a rural community and meets informally with the peasants. It can also involve the use of equipment such as video tape or audio tape to record messages and reactions to them. The purpose is to establish a dialogue between the rural population and the authorities.

Vertical communication upward

Messages are initiated by the people and conveyed through institutionalized channels to decision-makers outside the community. This pattern operated when the films made on Fogo Island were shown to Canadian Government officials.

Institutionalized feedback

Messages originated in a central source are exposed to typical receivers and changed as a result of their reactions. Later the messages are delivered to a wider audience. This pattern applies whenever producers pre-test communication materials with a selected group and then redesign them before distribution.

Collection-dissemination systems

Messages are sent from many sources to a central place where they are organized, simplified, illustrated, etc., and then disseminated through different channels. The ACPO newspaper *El Campesino* in Colombia illustrates this pattern because it publishes letters, poems and news received from rural readers and radio school monitors. The bulletin *Dissoo* (Dialogue) in Senegal prints letters from the villagers addressed to the Radio Educative Rurale and is widely read in administrative circles.

We cannot make a general judgement about the various patterns utilized by the programmes reviewed other than to say that each has its potential and its limitations. A diffusion pattern should be selected in accordance with the objectives of the programme it serves. If the programme's goal is passing on information, a direct broadcast model can be employed. But if the goal is true education, then a pattern facilitating audience participation and interaction is indispensable.

It is in this context that the difference between the traditional 'transmission-persuasion' communication models and those that stress problem identification and dialogue becomes all important. To understand the difference better, let us compare what takes place in a radio school on the one hand, and in a discussion group (radio forum or rural animation) on the other.

In the radio school, content is transmitted as a finished product to a relatively passive group of learners under the direction of a trained 'monitor'. In the discussion group, content is transmitted not as a finished product but as a set of issues or questions to which the group members apply, through discussion and debate, their own creative intelligence, personal experience and original interpretations.

In the radio school, the material broadcast is produced by professional teachers. In the discussion group, media programming often incorporates material originating with the receivers themselves.

In the radio school, feedback consists of evaluating how much content was learned. In the discussion group, feedback consists of integrating experiences, ideas, opinions, complaints and suggestions from the members in a mutual enrichment process.

In the radio school, the end result of communication-education is learning. In the discussion group the end result is understanding and, often, collective action.

This comparison is not intended to reduce the importance of the radio school or of any other kind of purely instructional use of communication media; instruction is most important and necessary. The comparison should, however, demonstrate the need to choose a diffusion model that agrees with the real objectives of the communication project.

Finally, an analysis of the case studies suggests some practical problems in utilization/diffusion that need attention in designing future programmes. One problem for projects involving radio or television, is reception; several of the case study projects were plagued poor of programme reception, and in some cases 'radio discussion groups' carried on without the use of radio. Another problem appearing frequently is the distribution of printed materials where these are supposed to supplement scheduled broadcasts. In many areas of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Philippines, materials either never arrived or appeared too late to coincide with the broadcasts to which they referred. It would seem that programme planners must allow more time for production and distribution and take more serious account of the problems of delivering materials in areas where transportation and mail services are poor.

Research and evaluation

In general, we can say that research is a process that helps in setting up and running a rural development programme—in identifying problems, suggesting approaches to meet these problems, choosing clientele and change agents, etc. A programme can conduct its own research; in addition, it can, and should where possible, rely on the results of research already available on previous related programmes and on the area in which it intends to operate.

Evaluation aims at determining to what extent the objectives set for a programme have been met and the reasons for its success or failure. Some programmes—pilot efforts, for example—are established mainly to provide evaluation results, to test the feasibility of a given approach.

The line between research and evaluation is not always clear—a programme can, for example, conduct an evaluation study after a first phase of operations and on the basis of these results modify subsequent operations.

Research and evaluation can be either formal or informal. In the informal type, data are collected through meetings with agents and clientele or by simple observation: these data are of course somewhat subjective, but none the less they can be useful. In formal research and evaluation, specialized personnel and instruments are used to collect data through precise sampling schemes and to analyse and interpret the data using rigorous scientific methods.

The results of both research and evaluation should be of use not only to those involved in a given programme but also to those who in the future may embark on similar efforts. Thus, these results should be expressed in such a way that scientists all over the world can understand and interpret them. This explains the importance of standardized research and reporting procedures.

We will not present the results and finding of research and evaluation here—the reader can refer back to the case studies and the sources given under them for these. But some general observations are in order.

Research

All the programmes described here carried out some form of research, whether formal or informal, before or during operations. Some of these efforts are described under 'Project Design', above.

If we look at the research carried out in setting up these rural development communication projects, one weakness is obvious. Most of this research was not aimed at discovering the real situation in which the project's clients found themselves—that is to say, the basis on which the project should construct its goals and strategies. What is meant by knowing the real situation is discovering the historical and structural causes of the problems observed (the latter being merely symptoms of underlying realities). To give an extreme example, the Tobago project for the Functional Education of Women (GROW) began by making a list of the island's deficiencies and problems. On the basis of this list, it was decided to design an educational programme directed to women. However, 'Project staff soon became convinced (at least implicitly) that the underlying problem was economic—lack of employment and earning opportunities—rather than simply a matter of education and attitudes'.

If the situation had been adequately diagnosed at the beginning, the staff would have known before launching the programme that the causes of the problems perceived were economic. A deeper analysis would probably have revealed that the economic problems themselves had underlying causes, and that any programme that did not attack these causes would have very little effect on women or anyone else on Tobago.

This is the weakest point in the use of research for programme design: the tendency to observe only superficial manifestations of underlying problems. The trouble is that if only symptoms are attacked, the underlying causes will continue to exist, thus making it necessary to design new programmes.

It is difficult to say to what extent these programmes took into account the findings of earlier research. Some programmes were extensions of previous efforts in other geographical areas—the radio rural forums in India, the education through communication projects in Senegal—and these obviously based their operations to some extent on the results of what had been tried elsewhere. The three radio campaigns in the United Republic of Tanzania offer a prime example of the use of research findings from one project to another. Studies of

the first campaign strongly influenced the design of the second, while the third, and largest, campaign gained enormously from lessons learned in the previous two.

Evaluation

The design of most of the programmes described here included plans for evaluation, even if in some (for example, PEIDEFER in Peru and GROW in Tobago) these plans were never adequately carried out. Those programmes deliberately designed as pilot efforts to test concepts or methods—for example, the pilot project in radio rural forums in India, the television viewing groups in Senegal, the multi-media and intensive family planning campaigns in Iran, the radio campaigns in the United Republic of Tanzania—obviously devoted the greatest efforts to evaluation. (In addition, some of the programmes were considered of such interest to international development experts that they inspired independent studies: Colombia's ACPO, the Indian radio rural forums, the Senegal pilot projects, and the Fogo Island programme are examples.) In some cases, evaluation procedures were established well in advance (the Philippine co-operatives development programme and the third Tanzanian radio campaign are good examples) and allowed for in scheduling project operations.

Many of the programmes enlisted social scientists from a wide variety of sources—universities, research institutes, commercial organizations, such as advertising agencies, government services, bilateral and international technical aid agencies—in their evaluation programmes. Some also trained local non-professional personnel to work in evaluation campaigns (extension officers, school-teachers, group leaders or animators, university students—even 'diary writers' in Iran: literate men and women who recorded conversations about family planning); these non-professionals, once trained in the technique of simple evaluation research, can be used in other programmes.

Organized evaluation efforts, of course, had to make extensive use of reporting procedures; where activities were widely scattered geographically (for example, in the Tanzanian campaigns), the problem of feedback, like the problem of distribution of materials, posed enormous difficulties. Even when trained, some group leaders found it difficult to fill in forms (in the Philippine co-operatives development campaign the reporting forms originally envisaged for the computerized reporting system proved too complicated and had to be simplified.) If there is one apparent lesson from evaluation in these programmes, it is that a successful evaluation system requires adequate training of local staff, well-designed instruments, a well-organized system of distributing instruments (and in some cases manuals on how to use them), a system for retrieving data which in turn presupposes an adequate network of supervisory staff, and an adequate and competent team of researchers to tabulate and interpret results. These are luxuries that few developing countries can afford. So providing for feedback of data, reactions and ideas remains a major concern, not only for purposes of evaluation but also for programmes aiming at increased two-way communication.

Two of the programmes covered here—MEB in Brazil and Fogo Island in Canada—present a challenge to traditional notions of evaluation. As we have said, evaluation involves a comparison of results with objectives: the clearer the objectives the easier the evaluation. But communication programmes that put

the major emphasis on people's participation and self-discovery cannot, by their very nature, have clearly defined objectives. Experience with the Fogo Process and related efforts suggests that 'It is impossible to predict what people given access to the media will do with it. Most likely, they will criticize and challenge some forms of established authority.' In this programme, the criteria for determining what effect the programme had had were rather general: an improvement in the economic and social life of the islanders and in their self-awareness, self-confidence, and over-all morale.

The Fogo Island programme raises another point related to research and evaluation that is touched on in some of the other case studies. The passage cited above goes on:

There is little sense in initiating a user-oriented communications project unless the social political climate is such that media users will be listened to no matter how unexpected their communications.

Thus, the diffusion of technology, the opening of communication channels, all the other aims of rural development programmes using communication come to naught unless both an infrastructure and a social climate conducive to development are present. As the Indian case put it:

Some action decisions were never implemented because necessary aid (e.g. provision of fertilizer) was unavailable or became available only after interest had been lost. Once again it was shown that communication aimed at bringing about change directly or indirectly is of little value if the tools of change are unavailable.

A survey of the PEIFEDER programme during its first phase revealed that while the mass-media component was expected to promote widespread acceptance of government-initiated development action, no such action was in fact taking place. When this is the case, even the best designed use of communication can have little effect.

Diffusion and exchange of information

To what extent are the findings of research and evaluation made available to those embarking on new rural development efforts?

A certain amount of information is available through the following sources:

Reports about programmes carried out in different countries. These are presented at national, regional, or international meetings of specialists or are published by the project's sponsors. An example would be Unesco's 'Reports and Papers on Mass Communication' series.

Research and evaluation studies carried out by scientists and published either in technical journals or in bulletin or book form. An example would be the study by Stefan A. Musto of Radio Sutatenza—Acción Cultural Popular (see 'Case Study 1', page 18).

Books written by communication experts or social scientists using case studies to discuss common qualities of various projects. Examples are Emile G. McAnany's bulletin on radio's role in development and Tony Dodds's broadsheet on multi-media approaches to rural education (see 'Bibliography').

Direct transfer of experience when staff members of one programme visit another programme, or when an international expert working on one programme moves to another country to start a new programme or join an on-going one.

Various other sources: correspondence between specialists, the few films that exist on programmes, a small number of bibliographies including references to publications on development communication programmes.

As this list shows, there are few sources of information on rural development involving communication. While a small number of communication specialists at the headquarters of the main international and bilateral aid agencies and at the headquarters of some of the largest national communication projects are well informed, most others at present or potentially engaged on this field are not.

The consequence of this inadequate dissemination of information is that governments and other agencies establishing new development communication projects are unable to learn from the achievements and mistakes of their predecessors and risk repeating errors already made elsewhere.

Among organizations and agencies concerned with communication programmes for rural development one omission is glaring: the universities. There are hundreds of schools of communication in the world today, but only a few of them have participated one way or another in development communication programmes or in their analysis and evaluation. Most of the students in these schools do not even know of the existence of such programmes—even when these are taking place in their own country.

What can be done to increase the dissemination and exchange of information and opinion?

One solution may be to strengthen the centres already existing that provide exchange and information on mass communication such as the East-West Communication Institute in Hawaii, the Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center in Singapore (AMIC), the Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores de Periodismo para América Latina (CIESPAL) in Ecuador, and others.

Another is to support the technical journals on communication published in different countries that devote particular attention to rural development: for example, *Media Asia* published by AMIC and *Chasqui* published by CIESPAL.

A third solution may be to allow for dissemination of information in the budgets of individual programmes, so that project officers can travel to other countries to describe what they are doing (and at the same time visit other programmes).

Another measure would be to encourage the publication of more books and brochures that describe and review the accomplishments and shortcomings of various programmes.

The international organizations concerned with rural development should periodically arrange seminars at which the most important aspects of project planning, execution, evaluation and so on are discussed by various groups affected by development communication: researchers, planners, teachers, practitioners, media operators and so on. Representative students from schools of communication could also be invited so that they could inform their colleagues of the proceedings upon return.

Finally, workshops should be organized on communication policies for rural development for national authorities responsible for various aspects of development: agriculture, health, education, co-operative development, and so on as well as for those in charge of the national mass media. A good example of a well-organized workshop of this type is the one held in Georgetown, Guyana, in 1973 with the aid of Unesco.

In this chapter we have examined key variables in ten development communication projects in rural areas and, in the process of this examination, raised a number of pertinent questions to ask about such projects.

In summary, it seems reasonable to state that many development communication projects have lacked a suitable theoretical foundation. In some cases this lack resulted from insufficiency—the project commenced before its purpose and direction had been adequately thought out. In other cases the project had an implicit or even stated basis in theoretical models, but these models were inappropriate for the task at hand and the social and cultural setting involved.

Thus, the need is twofold: to ensure that media practitioners make sufficient use of theoretical bases for the use of communication in rural development, and to see that these theoretical bases are suited to present-day and future development requirements. Practice in development communication is evolving rapidly as new approaches to the use of media and new technologies appear on the scene. Especially exciting are recent experiments with the use of media as a tool in community animation, mobilization and action, and the development of alternative media channels to meet community needs, especially those for self-expression and dialogue. As these trends continue, theoreticians will have to elaborate fresh models for the use of communication in rural development that break away from the old view of communication as an instrument of one-way instruction and persuasion. At the same time, practitioners should request the services of theoreticians to help ensure that the efforts on which they embark are realistically and logically conceived and that they make use of the entire range of knowledge and data available about the role of communication in rural development. For it is only by constantly analysing and seeking to avoid the mistakes and misconceptions of the past that we can hope to make communication better serve rural populations in the future.

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Is there a gap between theory and practice in rural-development efforts involving communication media? If so, why? And what can be done about it?

These questions are asked by Juan Díaz Bordenave, a communication specialist for the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of the Organization of American States. He has based his answers on a critical evaluation of ten case studies representing experiences in various parts of the world.

The result is a fascinating tool for specialists involved in mass communication with a rural objective. The suggestions he makes as to fundamental principles to be observed for greater efficiency can have major consequences for on-going and future projects in rural development.